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ABSTRACT 
 
This study consists of two essays. Using a dataset from 38 economies, the first essay 
examines the association between product market competition and accounting conservatism 
as well as whether this association varies with legal institutions and product market 
competition. In addition, I also investigate whether product market competition affects the 
positive association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism documented by 
prior studies. I find that: (1) product market competition is positively associated with 
accounting conservatism; (2) the positive association between product market competition 
and accounting conservatism is significantly stronger in countries with better legal 
institutions; (3) the positive association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism only exists in competitive industries; (4) the positive association 
between legal institutions and accounting conservatism documented by prior literature only 
exists in competitive industries. My empirical findings suggest that product market 
competition could drive managers to adopt conservative accounting. Moreover, this study 
indicates that legal institutions and product market competition are important for each other 
to function well. This study contributes to the literature on country- and industry-level 
determinants of accounting conservatism and stresses the important governance role of 
product market competition. 
In the second essay, I examine the association between ownership structure and 
accounting conservatism as well as how legal institutions influence this association. Using a 
comprehensive, firm-level ownership dataset for thirteen Western European countries to 
conduct the empirical analysis, I find that: (1) both wedge between control rights and 
cash-flow rights and dispersion of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners are 
positively associated with accounting conservatism; (2) legal institutions strengthen the 
positive association between wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights and accounting 
conservatism. This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it adds to 
the growing body of literature on the role of accounting conservatism in mitigating agency 
problems. Secondly, this study highlights the importance of the second largest controlling 
shareholder in affecting the level of accounting conservatism. Thirdly, this essay reinforces the 
important role played by legal institutions in influencing the installation of firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
Keywords: Legal Institutions; Product Market Competition; Ownership structure; 
Accounting Conservatism
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Chapter One: Legal Institutions, Product Market Competition and 
Accounting Conservatism 
1.1 Introduction 
Product market competition has long been regarded as an important industry-level 
governance mechanism in economics literature (Hicks 1935, Jensen 1993, Smith 1776). 
Although a great number of prior studies investigate how country- and firm-level corporate 
governance determines accounting conservatism (Ahmed and Duellman 2007, Ball, Kothari 
and Robin 2000, Ball, Robin and Wu 2003, Bushman and Piotroski 2006, Lafond and 
Roychowdhury 2008), few study investigates how product market competition, one of the 
most important industry-level governance mechanisms, influence accounting conservatism. 
Moreover, we also know little about how product market competition and legal institutions 
interplay in determining accounting conservatism. This paper attempts to investigate these 
important issues. Specifically, I examine four research questions. Firstly, how does product 
market competition affect accounting conservatism? Secondly, do the impacts of product 
market competition on accounting conservatism vary with legal institutions? Thirdly, 
whether the association between product market competition and accounting conservatism 
is nonmonotonic? Finally, how does product market competition affect the relation between 
legal institutions and accounting conservatism?  
Literature on the determinants of accounting conservatism primarily focuses on firm- 
and country-level factors while pays little attention to industry-level ones, such as product 
market competition. In this paper, I argue that product market competition could affect 
accounting conservatism in several different ways. Firstly, more intense product market 
competition is related to lower profitability, greater performance volatility and higher 
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liquidation risk, resulting in a firm’s higher demand for accounting conservatism to achieve 
more efficient contracting. Secondly, product market competition could affect the strategy 
of corporate disclosure, and thus impact on the recognition timeliness of both good news 
and bad news. Several studies predict that firms have incentives to report negative 
proprietary news and withhold positive news in an attempt to dissuade potential entrants 
(Darrough and Stoughton 1990, Evans and Sridhar 2002, Feltham and Xie 1992, 
Wagenhofer 1990) or to selectively communicate strategic information to existing rivals 
(Clinch and Verrecchia 1997, Darrough 1993), indicating firms will apply accounting 
conservatism to mitigate competitive pressure in product markets. An alternative viewpoint 
is that product market competition reduces the severity of agency problem, and thus lowers the 
demand for accounting conservatism. I’ll empirically test the competing viewpoints on the 
association between product market competition and accounting conservatism. Overall, I 
predict that the association between product market competition and accounting conservatism is 
positive.  
Legal institutions could impact on the relationship between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism through the following ways. On the one hand, 
more intense product market competition is related to higher liquidation risk, resulting in a 
firm’s higher demand for accounting conservatism to achieve more efficient contracting. 
Prior studies show that investors are more likely to choose liquidation when legal 
institutions are stronger (Claessens and Klapper 2005, Djankov, Hart, Nenova and Shleifer 
2006), leading to an even higher liquidation risk for firms in competitive industries of these 
countries. Therefore, in better legal institutions, the association between product market 
competition and liquidation risk is more pronounced, further boosting the positive 
association between product market competition and accounting conservatism. On the other 
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hand, well-functioning legal institutions help increase the flow of firm-specific information 
(DeFond, Hung and Trezevant 2007, Morck, Yeung and Yu 2000), making the positive 
association between product market competition and accounting conservatism even more 
pronounced. However, it is also possible that legal institutions could protect investors and 
lower the investors’ demand for conservative accounting to mitigate their concern on 
liquidation risk or liquidation cost triggered by product market competition. In this case, 
legal institutions might weaken the positive association between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism. In sum, I predict that legal institutions strengthen 
the positive association between product market competition and accounting conservatism. 
Nevertheless, the impacts of product market competition on accounting conservatism 
might vary with legal institutions simply because the association between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism is nonmonotonic. For example, suppose the 
association between product market competition and accounting conservatism is less 
pronounced when industry is concentrated (assume here industries are classified into either 
competitive or concentrated). If strong legal institutions are dominated by competitive 
industries while weak legal institutions by concentrated industries, then the association 
between product market competition is expected to be more pronounced in strong legal 
institutions. Here, the impacts of legal institutions on the association between product 
market competition and accounting conservatism might come from the nonmonotonic 
impacts of legal institutions, rather than the reasons I discussed above. To assuage this 
concern and further explore the association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism and the effects of legal institutions, I separate the full sample into 
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three groups
1
 and then regress Basu’s (1997) model in each group with important firm- and 
country-level variables controlled. The method of running regressions in different 
subsamples enables me to reveal nonmonotonic relations in case that they do exist
2
. 
Finally, since previous literature shows that competitive industries are distinctive from 
concentrated industries (Giroud and Mueller 2009, MacKay and Phillips 2005), the 
association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism might be influenced by 
the extent of product market competition. However, prior international studies which 
propose a positive association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism 
generally neglect the potential influences from product market competition (Ball, et al. 
2000, Ball, et al. 2003, Bushman and Piotroski 2006). In this paper, I argue that intense 
(low) product market competition could increase (decrease) the demand of contracting 
parties for accounting conservatism, enhance (lower) the litigation costs endured by the 
firm, and weaken (strengthen) the firm’s political influences, leading to a more (less) 
pronounced association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism. Based on 
the above discussion, I predict that the positive association between legal institutions and 
accounting conservatism is more pronounced in competitive industries.  
Following Basu (1997), I use asymmetric timeliness of economic loss recognition to 
proxy for accounting conservatism. The extent of product market competition is measured 
as negative one multiplied by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (hereafter, HHI), which is the 
sum of the squared market shares of the firms competing in each industry-country sample.
 
To calculate HHI, I get the sales data of both public firms and private firms from the 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD) Orbis. I use 8,190,848 observations (1,490,106 public and private 
                                                 
1 I separate the full sample into three groups according to the industry classification scheme used by the U.S. Department 
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1997): G1 – competitive industries (HHI<0.1), G2 – moderately concentrated 
industries (0.1<=HHI<0.18), and G3 – highly concentrated industries (HHI>=0.18). 
2 This methodology is similar to the one applied in Giroud and Mueller (2009). 
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companies, from 1999-2007) around the world to calculate HHI, which would more 
accurately reflect the extent of product market competition than ratios constructed using 
data only from Global Vantage, which is comprised almost entirely of publicly-traded firms 
(Ali, Klasa and Yeung 2005). Legal institutions (LI) examined in this paper include security 
regulation (SECREG), public enforcement (PUBLENF), investor protection (INVPRO), and 
rule of law (RULE). Using a sample of 84,835 observations from 38 economies spanning 
from 1999 to 2007, I find that: (1) product market competition is positively associated with 
accounting conservatism; (2) the positive association between product market competition 
and accounting conservatism is significantly stronger in countries with better legal 
institutions; (3) the positive association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism only exists in competitive industries; (4) the positive association 
between legal institutions and accounting conservatism documented by prior literature only 
exists in competitive industries. 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Firstly, this study adds to 
the research on determinants of accounting conservatism. Prior studies generally focus on 
country- and firm-level determinants of accounting conservatism, while this study 
investigate how product market competition, and important industry-level factor, affect 
accounting conservatism. My results report a positive association between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism, indicating that product market competition could 
drive managers to adopt accounting conservatism. 
Secondly, to my knowledge, this paper is the first empirical study to provide evidence 
on how the association between product market competition and accounting conservatism 
varies with legal institutions. In the empirical analysis, I find that the positive association 
between product market competition and accounting conservatism generally exist in strong 
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legal institutions. This finding is consistent with the view that legal institutions strengthen 
the positive association between product market competition and accounting conservatism 
and suggests that legal institutions are important for product market competition to function 
well.  
Thirdly, as far as I am aware, this study is the first one to reveal the nonmonotonic 
association between product market competition and accounting conservatism. By 
decomposing the full sample into different groups according to product market competition 
intensity, I find that the positive association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism only exists in competitive industries, supporting a nonmonotonic 
correlation between product market competition and accounting conservatism.  
Fourthly, it adds to the literature on the role of legal institutions in shaping accounting 
conservatism. By introducing product market competition as an important industry-level 
corporate governance mechanism, I find that only in competitive industries can legal 
institutions positively impact conservatism. This finding suggests that product market 
competition could affect the function of legal institutions. When industry is concentrated, 
legal institutions function limitedly in driving managers to act properly. The results deepen 
existing understanding of the determinants of accounting conservatism and extend prior 
studies, such as Bushman and Piotroski (2006), Ball et al. (2000) and Ball et al. (2003).  
Finally, this study complements the concurrent and independent research by Dhaliwal 
et al. (2008). Their study also finds that product market competition is positively associated 
with accounting conservatism, consistent with the findings of my paper. However, the 
empirical evidences of Dhaliwal et al. (2008) are from the U.S., a country dominated by 
competitive industries and equipped with the best legal institutions in the world. This 
specific U.S. setting might restrain us from understanding another two important research 
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questions: (1) how the association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism varies with legal institutions; and (2) whether such association is monotonic? 
In contrast, using an international dataset, my study provides a more complete 
understanding on the association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the 
conceptual framework of this essay, including discussions of the research questions and 
predictions. Section 1.3 describes the data and research design. Section 1.4 presents the 
summary statistics. Section 1.5 presents my empirical findings. Robustness checks are 
discussed in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 summarizes and concludes. Appendix 1-A includes a 
description of all empirical variables and their sources.  
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1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
1.2.1 Accounting Conservatism 
 
As an important accounting principle for centuries, conservatism could be observed by 
using the method introduced by Basu (1997) who defines conservatism as “the accountant’s 
tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than 
bad news as losses.” This definition of conservatism is also identified as conditional 
conservatism since it is contingent on the news event involved (Beaver and Ryan 2004). 
Prior studies indicate that accounting conservatism
3
 helps improve contracting efficiency 
and acts as a governance mechanism limiting managerial opportunism that is contrary to 
the interests of shareholders
4
. In this paper, I apply Basu’s (1997) model to empirically test 
how accounting conservatism is shaped jointly by product market competition and legal 
institutions. 
According to the agency theory, insiders possess more information than outsiders as 
well as motivations to favorably bias the information they supply to outsiders and take 
actions (such as asset substitution, consumption of perquisites, and empire building) that 
                                                 
3 In this paper, when I mention accounting conservatism, I refer to conditional accounting conservatism. 
4
Watts (2003) and Holthausen and Watts  (2001) argue that conservatism persists because it helps to address 
agency problems. Kim and Pevzner (2008) find that accounting conservatism is beneficial to stock market by 
reducing information asymmetry. Zhang (2008) documents that firms which apply more accounting 
conservatism experience faster debt covenant violations, thus “triggering the alarm” earlier to borrowers. 
Moerman (2008) shows that more conditionally conservative firms enjoy lower bid-ask spreads on the 
secondary loan markets. Bauwhede and Gent (2008) find that creditors reward conditional conservatism but 
not unconditional conservatism. Bushman et al. (2007) present evidence showing that the total and 
incremental investment response to declining opportunities increases with timely accounting recognition of 
economic losses, another form of accounting conservatism. Ahmed et al. (2002) show that debt-holders view 
conservatism as means of minimizing agency problems between debt-holders and shareholders and thus 
accounting conservatism is negatively related to cost of debt. Ball, Bushman and Vasvari  (2008) show that 
conservatism leads under-writers to hold lower stake in issued loans. Altogether, these studies provide strong 
evidence that conservatism is an effective tool in reducing information asymmetry and monitoring managers’ 
behavior.  
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result in deadweight losses (Jensen and Meckling 1976). By requiring higher veriﬁcation 
standards for gains recognition, accounting conservatism reduces managers’ ability and 
incentives to withhold information on expected losses, inflate earnings or overstate net 
assets (Ahmed, et al. 2002, Holthausen and Watts 2001, Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 
Watts 2003). Therefore, accounting conservatism could help improve contracting efficiency 
and eventually increase firm value. 
Accounting conservatism could also play a governance role in monitoring firms’ 
investment policies (Bushman, et al. 2007). By recognizing economic (or expected) losses 
earlier, conservatism facilitates identifying negative NPV projects or poorly performing 
investments, thus helping to improve investment efficiency (Bushman, et al. 2007). 
Therefore, conservatism effectively oversees the managers, limits deadweight losses from 
poor investment decisions, and increases ﬁrm values. Besides, conservatism could also 
alarm debtholders of the possible unfavorable situation earlier and help them make 
liquidation decisions correctly (Li 2009, Zhang 2008). In sum, conservative accounting 
functions as a monitoring mechanism of managers and of debt or other contracts, and is an 
important feature of corporate governance (Ball, et al. 2000). 
 The equilibrium level of accounting conservatism is determined by the demand of 
outsiders and the supply from insiders. Since the extant literature has identified legal 
institutions and product market competition as important country- and industry-level 
factors that influence the supply and demand of accounting conservatism, it is interesting to 
explore how they interact in determining accounting conservatism
5
. In particular, I 
                                                 
5 Prior studies on the determinants of accounting conservatism focus on firm- (e.g. Ahmed and Duellman 
2007, Lafond and Roychowdhury 2008, Qiang 2007) and country-level factors (e.g. Ball, et al. 2000, Ball, 
Robin and Sadka 2008, Ball, et al. 2003, Bushman and Piotroski 2006), while the research on industry-level 
determinants and on how different level of determinants interplay with each other is relatively scant. 
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empirically explore four research questions: (1) how does product market competition 
affect accounting conservatism? (2) do the impacts of product market competition on 
accounting conservatism vary with legal institutions? (3) whether the association between 
product market competition and accounting conservatism is nonmonotonic? (4) how does 
product market competition affect the relation between legal institutions and accounting 
conservatism? 
 
 
1.2.2 Product Market Competition and Accounting Conservatism 
 
Prior literature on the determinants of accounting conservatism primarily focuses on 
firm- and country-level factors while pays little attention to industry-level ones, such as 
product market competition. In this paper, I argue that product market competition could 
affect accounting conservatism in the following ways. Firstly, more intense product market 
competition is related to lower profitability, greater performance volatility and higher 
liquidation risk, resulting in a firm’s higher demand for accounting conservatism to achieve 
more efficient contracting. Firms operating in a concentrated industry are expected to earn 
persistently higher profits for a long time before the earnings revert to the normal level. 
These firms could benefit from monopoly power, collude with their industry peers to 
protect their economic rents, or prevent potential competitors from entering the market by 
imposing high entry barriers (Eaton and Lipsey 1981, Mueller 1977). Thus, firms with 
strong product market power earn higher profits and generate more persistent future 
earnings over time (Baginski, Lorek, Willinger and Branson 1999, Lev 1983). In addition, 
firms in concentrated industries are likely to demonstrate less volatile performance. When 
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facing adverse external shocks, such companies can transfer the negative effects on firm 
value onto consumers rather than absorb them (Gaspar and Massa 2006, Hou and Robinson 
2006). The above discussion indicates that product market competition is related to lower 
profitability, greater performance volatility and higher liquidation risk. Since accounting 
conservatism helps increase contracting efficiency, I expect that firms in more competitive 
industries have higher demand on accounting conservatism.  
Secondly, product market competition could affect the strategy of corporate disclosure, 
and thus impact on the recognition timeliness of both good news and bad news. On the one 
hand, prior studies suggest that firms have incentives to report negative proprietary news 
and withhold positive news in an attempt to dissuade potential entrants (Darrough and 
Stoughton 1990, Evans and Sridhar 2002, Feltham and Xie 1992, Wagenhofer 1990). In 
these studies, both capital market participants and potential entrants receive the information 
disclosed by the firm. The likelihood a potential competitor will join the market and occupy 
a portion of the incumbent firm’s market share increases as the incumbent firm discloses 
favorable information. However, the capital market participants respond to disclosed 
information and, ceteris paribus, the firm will benefit from higher (lower) prices when 
disclosing favorable (unfavorable) news. Thus, the firm must trade off between the 
possibility of lower valuation stemming from depressed market expectations and the 
reduced probability of entrance by a competitor due to more conservative accounting. 
Equilibria solutions from these models are consistent with the incumbent firm choosing to 
report more conservatively to dissuade possible competitors from entering into the product 
market. Therefore, from this aspect, product market competition is positively associated 
with accounting conservatism. On the other hand, models of rivalry between existing 
competitors suggest firms will provide more timely recognition of bad news and less timely 
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recognition of good news to communicate optimal output or pricing strategy to rival 
competitors. Darrough (1993) examines both Bertrand and Cournot competition and how 
firms in these environments will choose to voluntarily disclose proprietary information 
regarding costs and/or demand. Both the Bertrand and Cournot model of competition yields 
a disclosure strategy to disclose bad news and withhold good news, indicating a positive 
association between product market competition and accounting conservatism.  
However, an alternative viewpoint is that product market competition reduces the 
severity of agency problem, and thus lowers the demand for accounting conservatism. The 
misbehavior of insiders is more likely to jeopardize the survival of the firm in a competitive 
industry. Product market competition thus represents a natural constraint on the extraction 
of private benefits and lowers the demand for accounting conservatism to governance 
insiders. From this aspect, product market competition could assuage agency conflicts and 
lower the demand for accounting conservatism, leading to a lower level of accounting 
conservatism. 
I’ll empirically test the competing viewpoints on the association between product 
market competition and accounting conservatism. For the convenience of analysis, I predict 
that the association between product market competition and accounting conservatism is 
positive. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Accounting conservatism increases with the intensity of product market 
competition, ceteris paribus. 
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1.2.3 Legal institutions and the Relationship between Product Market Competition and 
Accounting Conservatism  
 
Legal institutions might influence the channels through which product market 
competition exerts its influences on accounting conservatism. On the one hand, more 
intense product market competition is related to higher liquidation risk, resulting in a firm’s 
higher demand for accounting conservatism to achieve more efficient contracting. Prior 
studies show that investors are more likely to choose liquidation when legal institutions are 
stronger (Claessens and Klapper 2005, Djankov, et al. 2006), leading to an even higher 
liquidation risk for firms in competitive industries of these countries. Therefore, in better 
legal institutions, the association between product market competition and liquidation risk 
is more pronounced, further boosting the positive association between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism.  
On the other hand, it is also possible that legal institutions could protect investors and 
lower the investors’ demand for conservative accounting to mitigate their concern on 
liquidation risk or liquidation cost triggered by product market competition. In this case, 
legal institutions might weaken the positive association between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism. Overall, I predict that legal institutions 
strengthen the positive association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism.  
Furthermore, the impacts of product market competition on accounting conservatism 
might vary with legal institutions simply because the association between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism is nonmonotonic. For example, suppose the 
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association between product market competition and accounting conservatism is more 
pronounced when industry is concentrated (assume here industries are classified into either 
competitive or concentrated). If strong legal institutions are dominated by competitive 
industries while weak legal institutions by concentrated industries, then the association 
between product market competition is expected to be more pronounced in strong legal 
institutions. Here, the impacts of legal institutions on the association between product 
market competition and accounting conservatism might come from the nonmonotonic 
impacts of legal institutions, rather than the reasons I discussed above. To assuage this 
concern and further explore the association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism and the effects of legal institutions on this association, I also 
investigate whether the association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism is nonmonotonic. To facilitate my analysis, I hypothesize that the association 
between product market competition and accounting conservatism is nonmonotonic. The 
above arguments lead to the following two hypotheses: 
H2a: The association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism is more pronounced in more competitive industries, ceteris paribus. 
H2b: The association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism is nonmonotonic. 
 
 
1.2.4 Product Market Competition and the Association between Legal Institutions and 
Accounting Conservatism  
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Prior studies document a positive association between legal institutions and 
accounting conservatism (Ball, et al. 2000, Ball, et al. 2003, Bushman and Piotroski 2006). 
The logic could be summarized as the followings. First, better investor protection and law 
enforcement are associated with more frequent use of accounting numbers in enforceable 
contracts, leading to a higher demand for verifiable accounting information in these 
countries. As a result, ﬁrms in countries with stronger legal institutions face higher 
‘‘contracting’’ demand for conservative financial report. I call it “contracting efficiency 
hypothesis”. The second is “litigation cost hypothesis”. Strong legal institutions would 
boost firms’ potential litigation costs of overstating economic performance. Since litigation 
pressure is one of the drivers of accounting conservatism, strong legal institutions are 
expected to be related to more conservative accounting. Finally, politicians interfere less 
with firms’ decision making in good legal institutions, enabling firms in these countries to 
better serve the interests of investors rather than other stakeholders (including political 
groups). In this vein, firms in strong legal institutions are more likely to report conservative 
numbers because conservatism is an important mechanism to protect investors’ interests. 
This is “political influence hypothesis”. 
However, previous international studies did not take account of the potential effects of 
product market competition, which has been identified as an important industry-level 
governance mechanism for a long time (Jensen 1993, Karuna 2007, Raith 2003)
6
. 
Importantly, recent studies point out that managerial incentives in competitive industries 
might be different from those in concentrated industries (Giroud and Mueller 2009, Karuna 
                                                 
6 In economic literature, product market competition has been identified as an important factor shaping 
managers’ incentives. Economists have argued that managers’ incentive problems are first and foremost an 
issue for firms in concentrated industries. Hicks (1935) point out that the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet 
life which managers tend to enjoy. Similarly, Adam Smith (1776) writes that “Monopoly [. . . ] is a great enemy 
to good management”. 
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2007). Prior studies simply use dummies to control industry fixed effects, a method that 
prevents us from understanding whether the impacts of legal institutions on accounting 
conservatism in competitive industries are different from those in concentrated industries. 
Similar to my argument, Ball et al. (2000) interpret the increasing trend of conservatism in 
most countries as the effects of increased international product market competition, which 
creates incentives for even code-law corporations to adopt accounting conservatism. Below 
I briefly discuss the potential effects of product market competition on the association 
between legal institutions and accounting conservatism. 
On the one hand, product market competition could affect the contractors’ demands for 
accounting conservatism in enforceable contracts. Firms operating in competitive industries 
generally earn persistently lower profits and less persistent future earnings over time 
(Baginski, et al. 1999).
7
 For example, firms in more competitive industries are less able to 
transfer the negative effects on firm value to consumers (rather than absorb them) when 
facing adverse external shocks (Gaspar and Massa 2006, Hou and Robinson 2006). As a 
result, firms in competitive industries exhibit higher firm-specific earnings volatility (Irvine 
and Pontiff 2007) and so higher default risk than firms in more concentrated industries 
(Hou and Robinson 2006). The resulting increased default risk leads to a higher demand of 
contracting parties for the timely recognition of bad news. In an extreme case, if the firms’ 
default risk is close to zero, then debt contractors almost have no demand for accounting 
                                                 
7 The industrial organization literature provides two competing views of the nature of industry concentration. 
The first is the structure/conduct/performance (SCP) paradigm, which assumes that industry structure (e.g., 
concentration) is exogenously given and affects the behavior and profitability of firms. The second assumes that 
industry concentration is an endogenous consequence of dynamic industry competition (e.g., Carter 1978). This 
view argues that more efficient firms tend to survive in a competitive market, and thus firms in concentrated 
industries are survivors of competition. It suggests that firms in concentrated industries are superior to other 
firms and that they exhibit better performance in the long run. Although the causes may be different, both 
perspectives indicate that firms in concentrated industries tend to earn abnormal profits because of economic 
rents. 
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conservatism. In this case, the association between legal institutions and accounting 
conservatism would be rather weak. Following this argument, product market competition 
strengthens the demand for accounting conservatism driven by the “contracting efficiency 
hypothesis”. 
On the other hand, product market competition could affect a firm’s political influence 
and its connections with government, and in turn impact on the predictions from “litigation 
cost hypothesis” and “political influence hypothesis”. Firms in concentrated industries are 
likely to own more political influence and are more closely related to politicians, which 
enables them to lobby for favorite policies, oppose disfavored policies, and get government 
subsidies (Chari and Gupta 2008). Chari and Gupta (2008) document that firms in 
concentrated industries are more successful in preventing the entry of foreign competitors. 
In their study, liberalized industries are significantly less concentrated, with an average HHI 
of 29%, than protected industries, which have an average HHI of 59%.
8
 Therefore, product 
market competition is expected to be associated with higher litigation costs. In turn, 
benefitting from political connections, firms in concentrated industries are more likely to 
assist government to fulfill its objectives and accept more government interferences. 
Moreover, since firms in more concentrated industries have deeper pockets, they are more 
likely to be the target of predatory governments. Therefore, product market competition is 
expected to be associated with less governmental interferences in firms’ financial reports. 
In sum, the relation between legal institutions and accounting conservatism is stronger in 
more competitive industries. 
                                                 
8 Collective action theory predicts that the political influence of specific industries is positively related to 
industry concentration. Incumbent firms in concentrated industries have a greater ability to organize and oppose 
policy changes that could adversely affect them (Olsen and Dietrich 1985). In this view, the likelihood of 
effective coordination in an industry increases with a decrease in the number of firms. If the private interest 
view holds, then firms in concentrated industries can more easily build barriers, succeed in lobbying for favorite 
policies, oppose disfavored policy changes, and get government subsidies. 
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On the base of the above discussion, I argue that the association between legal 
institutions and accounting conservatism would be more pronounced in more competitive 
industries. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H3: The association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism is more 
pronounced in industries with more intense product market competition, ceteris paribus.
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1.3 Research Design 
 
 I modify Basu’s (1997) model to empirically examine my research questions. To test H1, 
H2a, and H2b, I regress the following model in subsamples with different quality of legal 
institutions or with different intensity of product market competition, and then compare 
their coefficient differences: 
NIt=a0+b1Dt+b2RETt+b3Dt*RETt 
+b4PMC+b5PMC*Dt+b6PMC*RETt+b7PMC*Dt*RETt 
+b8SIZEt+b9SIZEt*Dt+b10SIZEt*RETt+b11SIZEt*Dt*RETt 
+b12LEVt+b13LEVt*Dt+b14LEVt*RETt+b15LEVt*Dt*RETt 
+b16MBRt+b17MBRt*Dt+b18MBRt*RETt+b19MBRt*Dt*RETt  
+b20LIT+b21LIT*Dt+b22LIT*RETt+b23LIT*Dt*RETt 
+Country, Industry
9
, and Year Fixed Effects+ξ                        (1) 
where NI is net income before extraordinary items (IC data 32), deﬂated by beginning of 
period prices (MVEt-1). D is an indicator variable equal to one if RET is less than zero, and 
zero otherwise. RET is holding period market-adjusted return, including dividends, over the 
ﬁrm’s ﬁscal accounting year. LIT controls for litigation risk and is coded one if a ﬁrm is in a 
litigious industry, zero otherwise. CIVIL is an indicator variable equals to one if the country 
has a civil law tradition, zero otherwise. I also control three firm-level control variables: 
firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), and market-to-book ratio (MBR). The measurement of the 
variables is detailed in 1- A. 
Similar to MacKay and Phillips (2005), I decompose industries into three groups 
according to the industry classification scheme used by the U.S. Department of Justice and 
                                                 
9 I control industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC code in all the models of this study. 
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Federal Trade Commision (1997): competitive industries (HHI<0.1), moderately 
concentrated industries (0.1<=HHI<0.18), and highly concentrated industries (HHI>=0.18). 
The three groups are labeled as G1, G2 and G3 respectively. Dividing full sample into 
subsamples facilitates my examination on how product market competition affects the 
association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism.  
b2 represent the timeliness of good news recognition, while b3 capture the incremental 
timeliness of bad news recognition over good new recognition. According to prior literature, 
b3 represent the extent of accounting conservatism. H1 predict b7 to be significantly 
positive. H2a predicts b7 is more pronounced in strong legal institutions than that in weak 
legal institutions. Moreover, H2b predicts b7 got from regressions in the sample of 
competitive industries is different from that got from regressions in sample of concentrated 
industries.  
To test the H3, I regress the following model in subsamples with different product 
market competition intensity: 
NIt=a0+b1Dt+b2RETt+b3Dt*RETt 
+b4LI+b5LI*Dt+b6LI*RETt+b7LI*Dt*RETt 
+b8SIZEt+b9SIZEt*Dt+b10SIZEt*RETt+b11SIZEt*Dt*RETt 
+b12LEVt+b13LEVt*Dt+b14LEVt*RETt+b15LEVt*Dt*RETt 
+b16MBRt+b17MBRt*Dt+b18MBRt*RETt+b19MBRt*Dt*RETt  
+b20LIT+b21LIT*Dt+b22LIT*RETt+b23LIT*Dt*RETt 
+b24CIVIL+b25CIVIL*Dt+b26CIVIL*RETt+b27CIVIL*Dt*RETt  
+Industry and Year Fixed Effects+ξ                               (2) 
where PMC is the measure of product market competition and equals to minus one 
multiplied by HHI. To calculate HHI, I get the sales data of both public firms and private 
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firms from the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) Orbis. I use 8,190,848 observations (1,490,106 
public and private companies, from 1999-2007) around the world to calculate HHI, which 
would more accurately reflect the extent of product market competition than ratios 
constructed using data only from Global Vantage, which is comprised almost entirely of 
publicly-traded firms (Ali, et al. 2005). 
H3 predicts the positive b7 of equation (2) got from regressions in the sample of 
competitive industries is more pronounced than that got from regressions in the sample of 
concentrated (highly concentrated) industries.  
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1.4 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
1.4.1 Sample Selection 
 
My sample consists of listed companies from 38 countries around the world: thirteen 
in Asia, sixteen in Western Europe, seven in North and South America, and three in 
Oceania and Africa
 10
. The sample period spans from 1999 to 2007 because of the data 
availability to calculate HHI. Accounting income and other financial data are from the 
Global Vantage Industrial/ Commercial (IC) ﬁles. Stock price data is drawn from the 
Global Vantage Issues ﬁles. I exclude ﬁrm-year observations with nonfully consolidated 
ﬁnancial statements, and those with missing values to compute dependent and independent 
variables. Next I keep only those observations in countries with legal institution measures 
for the 49 countries surveyed in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). I then delete observations in 
regulated industries, including financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and 
government-owned companies (SIC 9000-9999). To mitigate the influence of outliers, I 
winsorize each variable (NI, RET, LEV, SIZE, MBR) at the 1st and 99th percentile values 
and delete observations with the absolute value of studentized residuals greater than three 
in the accounting conservatism analysis. To calculate Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI), I 
draw financial data of both public and private firms from Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS
11
. I 
use 8,190,848 observations (1,490,106 public and private companies, from 1999-2007) 
                                                 
10 The 13 Asian countries include Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. The 16 European countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
I also include Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and the U.S. from North and South America and Australia, 
New Zealand, and South Africa from Oceania and Africa. 
11 Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS contains both the financial information of public and private firms. Therefore, it contains 
all the firms listed in Compustat Global Vantage.  
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around the world to calculate HHI, which would more accurately reflect the extent of 
product market competition than ratios constructed using data only from Global Vantage, 
which is comprised almost entirely of publicly-traded firms (Ali, et al. 2005). Table 1 
describes the sample selection procedure in details. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics by country, industry, and firm and 
provides the correlation matrix among the variables used in the regressions. Panel A reports 
the mean values of each variable for each country sample and for the total sample. The 
median and standard deviation of each variable are also reported for the total sample. As 
shown in the second column, the size of the country samples ranges from 106 firm-years 
for Argentina to 21,046 firm-years for the United States. Accounting earnings (NIt) have 
positive mean values except for those of Australia (-5.9%), Canada (-1.8%), Germany 
(-0.7%), Sweden (-2%), UK (-0.2%), and the U.S. (-0.6%). Consistent with Bushman and 
Piotroski (2006) and other prior studies, accounting earnings are negatively skewed and 
stock returns are positively skewed. Moreover, stock returns display greater volatility than 
accounting income, indicating that managers tend to smooth earnings. Industry 
concentration (HHIt) shows considerable variations across countries
12
. Japan has the 
highest average level of product market competition (PMCt = -0.134), and Turkey has the 
                                                 
12 As we can see from Table 2, the HHI for the US sample is less than those using data of public firms to calculate HHI 
but greater than those using the data from census database. This means that the accuracy of our HHI is higher than that 
only using data of public firms but lower than that using census database. This is because BVD does not cover all the 
private firms in the economy (although it covers most).  
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lowest (PMCt = -0.872). Leverage (LEVt) and market-to-book ratio (MBRt) also vary 
significantly across countries. The standard deviation of LEVt (MBRt) is 1.1 times (0.7 
times) greater than the mean value for the total sample. Firm size shows relatively lower 
variation compared with other variables. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the summary statistics of variables across different 
subsamples. G1’s mean (median) value of PMC is -0.051 (-0.047), indicating a high extent 
of product market competition. G3 gathers the most concentrated industries, with mean 
(median) value of PMC at -0.480 (-0.397). Standard deviation of PMC appears to be lowest 
in G2 while highest in G3. Consistent with prior studies, the mean and median values of 
accounting income show an increasing trend from G1 to G3, suggesting that companies in 
concentrated industries enjoy higher profitability. The mean (median) value of RET is 
highest in G2 (-1.3%) and shows no significant difference between G1 and G3, which is 
different from the findings of Hou and Robinson (2006). However, my sample consists of 
companies around the world, while Hou and Robinson (2006) only explore companies in 
the U.S. In addition, I do not control other important control variables, and so cautions 
should be made when comparing my statistics here with those of Hou and Robinson 
(2006).The mean and median value of LEV and SIZE are increasing from G1 to G3, 
consistent with prior findings. Moreover, LIT is highest in G1 and lowest in G3, indicating 
that firms in competitive industries endure more litigation risk. The standard deviations of 
NI, RET, LEV and MBR appear no clear trends across the three groups, while the standard 
deviations of SIZE and LIT are decreasing from G1 to G3. 
Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the country-level variables. Consistent with 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006), these statistics are tabulated using only one observation for 
every country. Panel C reveals signiﬁcant cross-country variations in institutional features. 
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Panel D reports correlation matrix for the country-level variables. Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal, and the correlation coefficients in 
bold are significant at the 5-percent level. SECREG, PUBLENF, INVPRO are signiﬁcantly 
higher in common law countries (CIVIL=0), and INVPRO is positively correlated with 
SECREG and PUBLENF.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Panel E of Table 2 reports the correlation matrix among the industry- and firm-level 
regression variables. Consistent with prior literature, accounting earnings (NIt) are 
positively correlated to stock returns (RETt). Product market competition (PMCt) is 
negatively related to accounting earnings (NIt), suggesting that product market competition 
has a negative effect on firms’ profitability. In addition, product market competition (PMCt) 
is negatively associated with firm size (SIZEt) and leverage (LEVt), indicating that product 
market competition shrinks the scale of firms and keeps them from using financial 
leverages. However, these results should be interpreted with cautions, as the pairwise 
correlations may suffer from correlated omitted variables, which are controlled for in the 
regression analyses. 
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1.5 Empirical Results 
 
My multivariate tests are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). For brevity, I 
suppress the tabulation of the estimates on control variables. In all the regressions, I report 
robust t-statistics after correcting for firm clustered standards errors that are likely to be 
present in the panel data (Petersen 2009). 
 
1.5.1 Regression results on how product market competition affects accounting 
conservatism 
 
 To explore how product market competition affects accounting conservatism, I 
regress equation (1) using the full sample. In this regression, I include the measure of the 
intensity of product market competition in Basu’s (1997) model and control for important 
control variables (firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, and litigation risk) identified in 
prior studies. Moreover, I also control country, industry (two-digit SIC code), and year 
fixed effects.  
As shown in Table 3, the coefficients on D*RET are significantly positive, indicating 
the existence of accounting conservatism. Moreover, the coefficients on PMC*RET are 
significantly negative and those on PMC*D*RET are significantly positive in the 
full-sample regressions, indicating that product market competition is negatively associated 
with the timeliness of good news recognition and positively associated with the incremental 
timeliness of bad news recognition. Since both negative timeliness of good news 
recognition and positive incremental timeliness of bad news recognition represent 
conservative accounting (Bushman and Piotroski 2006), the empirical results in Table 3 
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implies that the association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism is positive, consistent with my first hypothesis H1. 
Moreover, in the untabulated results, the coefficients on SIZE*D*RET (b11), 
LEV*D*RET (b15) and LIT*D*RET (b23) are significantly positive, while the coefficients 
on MBR*D*RET (b19) are significantly negative. These results are consistent with findings 
of prior studies, strengthening the validity of my empirical analysis. 
 
1.5.2 Regression results on how legal institutions affect the association between product 
market competition and accounting conservatism 
 
Table 3 also presents the by-group regressions results for equation (1) in strong and 
weak legal institutions separately. Panel A sets the legal institutions to Security Law 
(SECREG) and Public Enforcement (PUBLENF), while Panel B sets legal institutions to 
Investor Protection (INVPRO) and Rule of Law (RULE). 
As we can see from the subsample of strong legal institutions in Table 3, the 
coefficients on PMC*D*RET are significantly positive and the coefficients on PMC* RET 
are significantly negative in both Panel A and B. Moreover, the t-statistics of the 
coefficients on PMC*D*RET in the strong-legal subsamples are larger than those in the full 
sample in 3 out of 4 regressions.  
Surprisingly, the coefficients on PMC*D*RET are significantly negative in 3 out of 4 
regressions in the weak-legal subsamples, indicating that product market competition might 
drive managers to use less accounting conservatism in weak legal institutions. These results 
suggest that legal institutions strengthen the positive association between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism, consistent with the prediction of H2a. However, 
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they are contrary to H1 and the conjecture of Ball et al. (2000). It is possible that product 
market competition only works when its level is above certain threshold, then simply 
running the regression in the full sample including both competitive industries and 
concentrated industries might hide some important information and lead to biased results. 
For example, if weak legal institutions are dominated by concentrated industries and strong 
legal institutions are dominated by competitive industries, then the coefficient differences 
between weak legal institutions and strong legal institutions might be driven by the 
differences between competitive industries and concentrated industries. To avoid the 
problem of endogenous determined product market competition and reveal the possible 
nonmonotonic relationship between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism, I regress equation (1) across groups with different intensity of product 
market competition in strong- and weak-legal subsamples separately. In 5.3, I’ll summarize 
and discuss the main findings of these regressions.    
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
1.5.3 Regression results on whether the association between product market competition 
and accounting conservatism is nonmonotonic 
 
Table 4 provides the empirical analysis for H2b. I regress equation (1) across the three 
groups (G1-G3) in the subsamples of strong and weak legal institutions separately. Panel 
A/C/E/G present the by-group regression results in strong legal institutions, and Panel 
B/D/F/H present those in weak legal institutions.
13
 
                                                 
13 For brevity, I omit the by-group regression results of the full sample (including both strong and weak legal institutions), 
because the results are similar and support my conclusions.  
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 In strong legal institutions, the coefficients on PMC*D*RET are all significantly 
positive in competitive industries and only significantly positive in 2 out of 8 regressions in 
the moderately and highly concentrated industries. The results indicate that, even in strong 
legal institutions, the association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism is weak when product markets are concentrated.  
In the weak legal institutions, the coefficients on PMC*D*RET are significantly 
positive in 3 out of 4 regressions in competitive industries, and the t-statistics of these 
coefficients are significantly lower than those in the strong legal institutions (P-values on 
the coefficient differences are all less than 0.01), supporting H1 and H2a. While in 
moderately and highly concentrated industries, the coefficients on PMC*D*RET are 
significantly positive in 1 out of 8 regressions (Panel H, moderately concentrated industries) 
and insignificant in the remaining 7 regressions. Moreover, in the moderately and highly 
concentrated industries, the coefficients on PMC*D*RET are significantly lower in weak 
legal institutions than those in strong legal institutions in 6 out of 8 cases (except when 
LI=rule of law), consistent with my second hypothesis. Generally, the results in Table 4 
suggest that the association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism is nonmonotonic, only significantly positive in competitive industries, and 
more pronounced in stronger legal institutions. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
1.5.4 Regression results on how product market competition affects the association 
between legal institutions and accounting conservatism  
 
To detect the effects of product market competition on the association between legal 
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institutions and accounting conservatism, I run regressions in three different groups, with 
G1 representing the most competitive industries and G3 the most concentrated industries. 
The results are presented in Table 5. I use Security Regulation (SECREG), Public 
Enforcement (PUBLENF), Investor Protection (INVPRO), and Rule of Law (RULE) to 
proxy for legal institutions in Panel A, B, C and D respectively. 
As shown in Table 5, the coefficients on D*RET are significant in all the groups, 
indicating the existence of accounting conservatism in all the groups when legal institutions 
are weak. This is not surprising since accounting conservatism is innate in the accounting 
discipline and is driven by many different factors, such as contracting, shareholder 
litigation, taxation, and accounting regulation (Watts 2003).  
Consistent with the results of Bushman and Piotroski (2006), the coefficients on 
LI*D*RET (b7) are significantly positive in the full sample for 3 out of 4 regressions 
(except Panel A), indicating a positive association between legal institutions and accounting 
conservatism. However, the regression results are different across the three groups. 
Strikingly, in the subsamples, b7 is only significantly positive in competitive industries. In 
competitive industries, b7 is significantly positive in all the four regressions. In moderately 
concentrated industries, b7 is insignificantly positive in all the four regressions. Moreover, 
in the highly concentrated industries, the results are mixed. Therefore, in G2 and G3, I find 
no evidence of positive association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism. 
This suggests that the positive association between legal institutions and accounting 
conservatism documented by the prior studies only holds in competitive industries.  
In sum, the empirical results in Table 5 provide evidences consistent with my first 
hypothesis and imply that when industry is concentrated legal institutions function 
limitedly. 
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[Insert Table 5 around here] 
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1.6 Robustness Checks 
 
1.6.1 Reestimation using Ball & Shivakumar (2006) Model  
 
An important concern is that the Basu’s (1997) Model applied in the empirical tests may be 
greatly affected by the different extent of market efficiency around the world. To assuage this 
concern, I borrow the model from Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) to examine the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings without reference to security prices. Speciﬁcally, I present estimations of the 
following model: 
ACCRUALSt=c0+c1NCFOt+c2CFOt+c3NCFOt*CFOt 
+c4PMC/LIt+c5PMC/LIt*NCFOt+c6PMC/LIt*CFOt 
+c7PMC/LIt*NCFOt*CFOt 
+ c8FASSETt+c9FASSETt*NCFOt+c10FASSETt*CFOt+c11FASSETt*CFOt 
+ c12ΔSALESt+c13ΔSALESt*NCFOt+c14ΔSALESt*CFOt+c15ΔSALESt*N*CFOt 
+ Fixed Effects+ξ                                                      (3) 
where ACCRUALSt is current period accruals, CFOt is current period operating cash flows, and 
NCFOt is an indicator variable equal to one if CFOt is negative, zero otherwise. Since Hribar 
and Collins (2002) argue that current (working capital) accruals are biased when estimated 
from changes in balance sheet data, I use the CFO data directly from cash flow statement in 
this paper. As we can see from Table 6, the coefficients on PMC*NCFO*CFO are significantly 
positive, consistent with H1. Moreover, in the subsample of strong legal institutions, the 
coefficients on PMC*NCFO*CFO are significantly positive in all the four regressions. While 
in subsample of weak legal institutions, the coefficients on PMC*NCFO*CFO are insignificant 
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in all the four regressions. This indicates that legal institutions strengthen the positive 
association between product market competition and accounting conservatism, consistent with 
H2a. In Table 6.2, we can see that positive association between product market competition 
generally exists in the group of competitive industries. In moderately and highly concentrated 
industries, there are only 2 out of 16 regressions report positive coefficients on 
PMC*NCFO*CFO. The evidences in Table 6.2 indicate a nonmonotonic association between 
product market competition and accounting conservatism. Finally, Table 6.3 reports that the 
positive association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism only exists in 
competitive industries, consistent with the findings in the main tables. Overall, the results here 
are similar to those in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5, further strengthen the validity of my 
conclusions.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
1.6.2 Including other measures of product market competition 
 
Recent studies of industry competition suggest that competition encompasses several 
dimensions, such as product substitutability, market size, and entry costs, given the level of 
concentration (e.g., Karuna 2007, Raith 2003).
14
 Hence, I introduce into my regressions three 
different dimensions of industry concentration as alternative measures of the HHI – product 
substitutability (DIFF), market size (MKTSIZE), and entry cost (ENTCOST) – which are 
described in Appendix 1-A. In Table 7.1, the coefficients on MKTSIZE*D*RET and 
                                                 
14They argue that concentration by itself may be a poor proxy for competition, as the relation between concentration and 
competition is not clear. 
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PMC*D*RET are significantly positive and those on ENTCOST*D*RET are significantly 
negative, consistent with my first hypothesis. However, the coefficients on DIFF*D*RET are 
insignificant. Moreover, the above positive associations generally exist in strong legal 
institutions, consistent with H2a. In Table 7.2, the positive association between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism only exists in competitive industries, consistent with 
H2b. Overall, the results in Table 7 are consistent with those in the main tables. 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
 
1.6.3 Reestimation using three-year Basu (1997) specification 
 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) argue that the beginning composition of equity value 
affects asymmetric timeliness measured over short horizons. Specifically, past timeliness of 
earnings with respect to returns influences future earnings timeliness over short periods, which 
might affect the results of Basu’s (1997) model. To mitigate the concern that one-year Baus’s 
(1997) model might lead to biased results, I reexamine my research questions using earnings 
and return over longer periods, speciﬁcally, over the following three years. 
NIt-3,t=d0+d1Dt-3,t+d2RETt-3,t+d3Dt-3,t*RETt-3,t 
+d4PMCt/LIt+d5PMCt/LIt *Dt-3,t+d6PMCt/LIt *RETt-3,t 
+d7PMCt/LIt *Dt-3,t*RETt-3,t 
+Control Variables +Fixed Effects+ξ                                 (4)                                                                                                             
where NI is equal to the sum of net income before extraordinary items over the estimation 
period divided by beginning of estimation period market value of equity. RET is equal to the 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold return over the estimation period. D is equal to one if RET is 
negative, zero otherwise. D is equal to one if RET is negative, zero otherwise. 
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The untabulated results of replicating the results in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 using 
three-year asymmetric timeliness measures are similar to my main results.  
 
 
1.6.4 Using firm-level accounting conservatism measure 
 
Basu’s (1997) return model has several economic and econometric problems (Dietrich, 
Muller and Riedl 2007, Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan 2007). To assuage the concern that my 
estimation on accounting conservatism is noisy, I use the methodology proposed by Khan and 
Watts (2007) to calculate firm-level accounting conservatism measure – C_score. Then I 
reexamine all the research questions using C_score as the dependent variable, and the empirical 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. Moreover, I also use industry-average C-scores as the 
dependent variable to reinvestigate all the research questions and get similar results. 
 
1.6.5 Influence of the Cutting Point of the Industry Groups 
 
In this study, I separate the full sample into three groups according to the industry 
classification scheme adopted by the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission (1997). However, whether the classification scheme is also suitable for countries 
outside the U.S. is unknown. To increase the robustness of my study, I follow Giroud and 
Mueller (2009) to divide the full sample into three equal-sized groups based on whether the 
HHI lies in the lowest, medium, or highest tercile of its empirical distribution. Overall, the 
results are similar to my main results. However, we should note here that this criterion is also 
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arbitrary and my computation of HHI generally overestimates the HHI because it is impossible 
to get the financial data of all the firms around the world. 
 
1.6.6 Influence of other important country-level control variables 
 
To keep my study comparable to Bushman and Piotroski (2006), I only include legal 
origin as the country-level control variable in equation (1). However, Ball et al. (2008) argue 
that debt markets – not equity markets – are the primary influence on the adoption of 
accounting conservatism. To verify that my results are not driven by omitted market 
importance variables that are correlated with legal institutions, I add the size of debt market 
and equity market into my regression model and reexamine the tests on equation (1). The 
results (untabulated) are similar to those reported in Table 3. 
 
1.6.7 Other robustness checks 
 
I also conduct a number of other robustness checks. Firstly, I adopt two typical industry 
measures, a four- and an eight-firm concentration ratio, as alternative industry concentration 
measures. In addition, it is possible that there is competition among firms in countries located 
in the same region. In this case, calculation of HHI using regional classification might be more 
accurate than a within-country calculation. Therefore, I also calculate HHI using regional 
classification
15
. Empirical tests using the above alternative industries measures produce similar 
results to my main results. Secondly, to accommodate the potential nonlinear relation, I 
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transform HHI into a fractional rank variable, and reestimate all the regressions. The results 
remain qualitatively unchanged. Thirdly, as the sample size varies across countries, I apply 
weighted least squares (WLS) procedures, placing an equal weight on each country sample. The 
untabulated results are similar to those reported in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5. In sum, the 
sensitivity tests reveal that my results appear robust. Fourthly, the PMC is located between 0 
and -1 and thus is a truncated variable. To avoid empirical problems caused by this truncated 
variable, I standardize PMC so that PMC could be both positive and negative, and reexamine 
all the research questions. In the untabulated table, the results are consistent with my 
predictions. Fifthly, I also run the industry-level regressions to assuage the problem that the 
results might be driven by the industries with great number of firms. I find results consistent 
with the main results and further strengthen the robustness of my conclusions (untabulated).  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
15 According to World Bank, I classify countries into six regions: Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia.  
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1.7 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I examine the association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism, and whether this association varies with legal institutions and product 
market competition. Moreover, I also investigate whether product market competition 
influences the positive association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism 
documented by prior studies.  
In sum, I have the following empirical findings. First, product market competition is 
positively associated with accounting conservatism. Second, the positive association between 
product market competition and accounting conservatism is significantly stronger in countries 
with better legal institutions. Third, the positive association between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism only exists in competitive industries. Finally, the 
positive association between legal institutions and accounting conservatism documented by 
prior literature only exists in competitive industries. 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, this study adds to the 
research on determinants of accounting conservatism. Prior studies generally focus on country- 
and firm-level determinants of accounting conservatism, while this study investigate how 
product market competition, and important industry-level factor, affect accounting 
conservatism. Second, to my knowledge, this paper is the first empirical study to provide 
evidence on how the association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism varies with legal institutions. My results suggest that legal institution strengthen 
the effects of product market competition on accounting conservatism. Third, as far as I am 
aware, this study is the first one to reveal the nonmonotonic association between product 
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market competition and accounting conservatism. By decomposing the full sample into 
different groups according to product market competition intensity, I find that the positive 
association between product market competition and accounting conservatism only exists in 
competitive industries, supporting a nonmonotonic correlation between product market 
competition and accounting conservatism. Finally, it adds to the literature on the role of legal 
institutions in shaping accounting conservatism. By introducing product market competition as 
an important industry-level corporate governance mechanism, I find that only in competitive 
industries can legal institutions positively impact conservatism. This finding suggests that 
product market competition could affect the function of legal institutions. When industry is 
concentrated, legal institutions function limitedly in driving managers to act properly. The 
results deepen existing understanding of the determinants of accounting conservatism and 
extend prior studies, such as Bushman and Piotroski (2006), Ball et al. (2000) and Ball et al. 
(2003). 
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Appendix 1-A Variable Definitions 
 
Variable                          Definition                                                                
Country Variables 
CIVILt       Indicator variable equal to zero if the country has a civil law tradition (i.e., 
French, German or Scandinavian legal tradition), one otherwise. Variable coded 
as missing if country has a socialist legal tradition. 
SECREGt     Security regulation in Hail and Leuz (2006) that is the arithmetic mean of the 
three La Porta et al. (2006) indices: disclosure requirement, liability standard, 
and public enforcement indices. 
PUBLENFt Index of public enforcement of securities laws, measured as the arithmetic mean 
of four underlying indices: Supervisor Characteristics index, investigative 
Powers index, Orders index and Criminal index. The variable is ranked between 
0 (weak public enforcement to 1 (strong public enforcement). 
INVPROt  Index of investor protection, constructed as the principal component of 
disclosure, liability standards, and anti-director rights. Scale is from 0 to 10. 
This data is available from La Porta et al. (2006). 
RULEt  Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP. Data on the 
number, composition and share of output supplied by State-operated enterprises 
and government investment as a share of total investment were used to construct 
the 0 (high percentage)-to-10 (low percentage) ratings. All country-year 
observations are based on the nearest available rating. Ratings are available for 
calendar years 2000 and 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2006. This data is available from 
the 2008 Annual report and dataset of Economic Freedom of the World. 
Industry Variables 
HHIt   Herfindahl-Hirschman index is the sum of the squared market shares of the 
firms competing in each industry-country sample. Industry membership is 
classified by the three-digit SIC code. This data is get from Bureau van Dijk 
(BvD) Orbis. 
PMCt   Index of product market competition, which is calculated as minus one 
multiplied by the HHIt, consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2008). 
DIFFt  DIFF is equal to the sales/operating costs for each industrial segment: operating 
costs include the cost of goods sold; selling, general, and administrative 
expenses; and depreciation, depletion, and amortization. Industry segment is 
classified by the three-digit SIC code. DIFF measures the extent of product 
substitutability in the industry. 
MKTSIZEt  Natural logarithm of industry sales (industry sales is computed as the sum of 
segment sales for firms operating in the industry). Industry segment is classified 
by the three-digit SIC code.  
ENTCOSTt  Natural logarithm of the weighted average of the gross value of the cost of 
property, plants, and equipment for firms in an industry, weighted by each 
firm’s market share in the industry. Industry membership is classified by the 
three-digit SIC code. 
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CONC4t   Proportion of sales in the industry accounted for by the four largest firms (by 
sales) in the industry (industry sales are computed as in MKTSIZE above).  
CONC8t   Proportion of sales in the industry accounted for by the eight largest firms (by 
sales) in the industry (industry sales are computed as in MKTSIZE above).  
 
Firm Variables 
RETt  Holding period market-adjusted return, including dividends, over the ﬁrm’s 
ﬁscal accounting year. This data is draw from Standard and Poor’s Global 
Vantage Issues ﬁles. 
MVEt  Market value of equity at the end of a given ﬁscal year, deﬁned as number of 
shares outstanding times closing price available for the last month of the ﬁscal 
year. This data is gathered from Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage Issues 
ﬁles. 
NIt  Net income before extraordinary items (IC data 32), deﬂated by beginning of 
period prices (MVEt-1). This data is draw from Standard and Poor’s Global 
Vantage Industrial /Commercial ﬁles. 
Dt  An indicator variable equal to one if RET is less than zero; zero otherwise. 
CFOt  Operating cash ﬂow, deﬂated by beginning of period prices (MVEt-1). This data 
is draw from Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage Industrial /Commercial ﬁles. 
ACCRUALSt  Total accruals, deﬂated by the average total assets, deﬁned as Net income 
before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities, scaled by 
the average total assets. This data is draw from Standard and Poor’s Global 
Vantage Industrial /Commercial ﬁles. 
NCFOt  An indicator variable equals to one if CFOt is less than zero; zero otherwise. 
LEVt  Leverage is the total debt deflated by the average total assets. 
SIZE  Firm size is the natural logarithm of the total assets (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
at the end of fiscal year t. 
MBRt    Market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity. 
LITt         LIT is coded one if a ﬁrm is in a litigious industry - SIC codes 2833–2836, 
3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370 - and zero otherwise. 
FASSET     Book value of fixed assets scaled by the average total assets. 
ΔSALESt     Change in sales scaled by the average total assets. 
_________________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 1 Sample Selection 
 
Sample-Selection Process 
Obs. 
Removed Obs. Remaining 
Initial sample from 1999 to 2007 in the Global Vantage 
database for the 38 economies
 
in Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) 
 
After eliminating firms with nonfully consolidated 
financial report 
 
After eliminating firms with missing values of 
dependent and independent variables 
 
After eliminating financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) 
and government-owned companies (SIC 9000-9999) 
 
After excluding observations with |studentized 
residuals|>3
 
 
 
 
 
 
(7,125) 
 
 
(33,389) 
 
 
(1,083) 
 
 
(2,263) 
 
 
128,695 
 
 
121,570 
 
 
88,181 
 
 
87,098 
 
 
84,835 
 
Notes: This table presents the sample selection process and data requirements for the regressions. The final 
sample for these regressions consists of listed companies from 38 economies: thirteen in Asia (Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Turkey), sixteen in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), six in North 
and South America (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the U.S.), and three in Oceania and Africa 
(Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa from Oceania and Africa). 
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Table 2 Summary statistics and correlations 
 
Panel A: Country-level descriptive statistics 
Country Obs NI RET PMC LEV SIZE MBR LIT 
Argentina 106 0.057 -0.065 -0.669 1.174 20.347 5.289 0.151 
Australia 3923 -0.059 -0.030 -0.326 0.280 17.456 3.187 0.179 
Austria 335 0.043 0.001 -0.550 0.887 19.451 1.925 0.093 
Belgium 538 0.042 0.006 -0.283 0.764 19.594 2.508 0.201 
Brazil 728 0.045 -0.123 -0.459 0.415 20.740 9.009 0.089 
Canada 1774 -0.018 -0.002 -0.430 0.552 19.918 2.831 0.193 
Chile 447 0.048 -0.002 -0.504 0.660 19.917 1.895 0.092 
Denmark 515 0.021 -0.046 -0.723 0.639 18.731 2.687 0.140 
Finland 683 0.030 0.002 -0.331 0.508 19.357 2.403 0.145 
France 3288 0.019 -0.042 -0.148 0.695 19.223 2.589 0.178 
Germany 3560 -0.007 -0.007 -0.263 0.701 19.067 2.438 0.192 
Greece 408 0.057 0.041 -0.350 0.529 20.066 3.740 0.152 
Hong Kong 569 0.034 -0.047 -0.720 0.528 19.694 1.625 0.274 
India 812 0.112 -0.073 -0.256 0.862 19.689 3.154 0.220 
Indonesia 782 0.071 -0.061 -0.626 1.466 18.285 2.197 0.113 
Ireland 182 0.023 -0.060 -0.808 0.279 18.645 3.076 0.082 
Israel 263 0.033 0.003 -0.571 0.873 19.896 2.657 0.327 
Italy 1236 0.002 0.008 -0.183 0.692 20.082 2.299 0.120 
Japan 17776 0.023 0.001 -0.134 1.070 19.828 1.561 0.194 
Korea 1240 0.104 0.017 -0.213 1.265 20.536 1.396 0.261 
Malaysia 3586 0.025 -0.014 -0.352 0.870 18.158 1.346 0.104 
Mexico 278 0.076 -0.007 -0.620 0.604 21.200 1.850 0.180 
Netherlands 979 0.030 -0.024 -0.392 0.491 19.525 3.511 0.179 
New Zealand 276 0.045 0.035 -0.842 0.498 18.626 2.774 0.156 
Norway 556 0.017 0.025 -0.643 0.727 19.120 3.028 0.169 
Pakistan 180 0.155 -0.080 -0.564 0.644 18.800 2.130 0.056 
Philippines 426 0.007 -0.147 -0.668 1.011 18.265 1.905 0.157 
Portugal 142 0.033 -0.023 -0.281 1.274 20.216 2.253 0.155 
Singapore 2265 0.040 0.001 -0.313 0.566 18.368 1.788 0.233 
South Africa 570 0.091 -0.067 -0.595 0.303 19.536 3.120 0.267 
Spain 735 0.054 0.000 -0.189 0.548 20.547 3.123 0.099 
Sweden 1425 -0.020 -0.026 -0.226 0.320 18.603 3.077 0.165 
Switzerland 1057 0.038 0.028 -0.525 0.460 19.849 3.116 0.194 
Taiwan 3439 0.039 0.012 -0.264 0.581 19.147 1.712 0.464 
Thailand 1659 0.083 -0.005 -0.278 1.082 18.149 1.612 0.083 
Turkey 116 0.094 -0.027 -0.872 0.303 20.352 2.813 0.267 
UK 6935 -0.002 0.001 -0.422 0.379 18.844 3.112 0.209 
USA 21046 -0.006 -0.087 -0.200 0.606 20.137 3.110 0.278 
 84835        
Mean  0.014 -0.029 -0.271 0.708 19.451 2.590 0.216 
Median  0.046 -0.126 -0.165 0.241 19.361 1.531 0.000 
Std.  0.180 0.566 0.270 1.459 1.939 4.308 0.412 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics across Groups 
                       Mean  Median                         Std.
 G1 G2 G3  G1 G2 G3  G1 G2 G3 
NI 0.005 0.008 0.025  0.039 0.042 0.053  0.170 0.196 0.178 
RET -0.033 -0.013 -0.033  -0.127 -0.122 -0.127  0.566 0.598 0.552 
PMC -0.051 -0.136 -0.480  -0.047 -0.134 -0.397  0.026 0.022 0.263 
LEV 0.483 0.516 0.520  0.457 0.511 0.519  0.285 0.287 0.268 
SIZE 0.478 0.506 0.512  0.467 0.515 0.522  0.269 0.295 0.298 
MBR 0.501 0.492 0.503  0.498 0.488 0.507  0.290 0.292 0.286 
LIT 0.264 0.252 0.168  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.441 0.434 0.374 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for country-level variables 
Variable n Mean Std. Min 10
th
 25
th
 50
 th
 75
 th
 90
 th
 Max 
CIVIL 38 0.63  0.49  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
SECREG 38 1.06  0.43  0.34  0.48  0.75  1.03  1.36  1.71  1.88  
PUBLENF 38 0.50  0.26  0.00  0.15  0.29  0.50  0.69  0.88  0.90  
INVPRO 38 3.18  1.37  0.00  1.00  2.00  3.00  4.00  5.00  5.00  
RULE 38 0.61  0.50  0.00  0.10  0.36  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
 
Panel D: Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman rank (below the diagonal) correlations 
Variable CIVIL SECREG PUBLENF INVPRO RULE   
CIVIL 1 -0.546 -0.436 -0.468 0.053   
SECREG -0.546 1 0.684 0.794 -0.162   
PUBLENF -0.436 0.684 1 0.582 -0.377   
INVPRO -0.468 0.794 0.582 1 -0.077   
RULE 0.053 -0.162 -0.377 -0.077 1   
 
Panel E: Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman rank (below the diagonal) correlations 
Variable NI RET PMC LEV SIZE MBR LIT 
NI 1 0.242 -0.053 -0.064 0.196 0.065 -0.075 
RET 0.362 1 -0.002 -0.131 0.001 0.243 -0.007 
PMC -0.089 -0.000 1 -0.041 -0.012 0.000 0.093 
LEV 0.004 -0.100 -0.047 1 0.234 -0.424 -0.153 
SIZE 0.182 0.076 -0.037 0.239 1 0.100 -0.039 
MBR 0.006 0.217 -0.011 -0.418 0.100 1 0.110 
LIT -0.103 -0.040 0.089 -0.153 -0.040 0.111 1 
 
Panel A of this table presents the country-level summary statistics for the research variables. The mean values 
of each variable are calculated and reported for each sample country. The last three rows report the 
cross-country mean, median, and standard deviation. Panel B of this table presents the mean and median 
statistics of the research variables across the three subsamples (G1-G3). Panel C of this table reports the 
descriptive statistics for country-level variables. Panel D of this table presents correlation matrix of 
country-level variables. Panel E of this table presents correlation matrix of firm- and industry-level variables 
for 84,835 observations over the 1999-2007 period. The correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 
5-percent level. See Appendix 1-A for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 Evidences on the association between product market competition and accounting 
conservatism and how it is affected by legal institutions 
 
Panel A: Legal institutions=Security law & Public Enforcement 
 Legal Institution=Security Law  Legal Institution=Public Enforcement 
Variable All firms Strong  Weak   All firms Strong  Weak  
RET -0.019* -0.049*** 0.054***  -0.019* -0.053*** 0.050*** 
 (-1.654) (-3.184) (3.516)  (-1.654) (-3.419) (3.446) 
D*RET  0.283*** 0.332*** 0.152***  0.283*** 0.342*** 0.146*** 
 (14.58) (13.26) (5.304)  (14.58) (13.45) (5.374) 
PMC*RET -0.028*** -0.046*** 0.005  -0.028*** -0.048*** 0.001 
 (-3.529) (-4.391) (0.380)  (-3.529) (-4.494) (0.071) 
PMC*D*RET 0.059*** 0.124*** -0.073***  0.059*** 0.129*** -0.081*** 
 (3.387) (5.538) (-2.614)  (3.387) (5.677) (-2.929) 
Country/Industry/
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 84835 53085 31750  84835 49047 35788 
Adj. R-squared 0.233 0.250 0.219  0.233 0.248 0.224 
Panel B: Legal institutions=Investor Protection & Rule of Law 
 Legal Institution=Investor Protection  Legal Institution=Rule of Law 
Variable All firms Strong  Weak   All firms Strong  Weak  
RET -0.019* -0.052*** 0.059***  -0.019* -0.026** 0.039 
 (-1.654) (-3.339) (3.948)  (-1.654) (-2.047) (1.400) 
D*RET  0.283*** 0.342*** 0.137***  0.283*** 0.297*** 0.137*** 
 (14.58) (13.41) (4.847)  (14.58) (14.10) (2.648) 
PMC*RET -0.028*** -0.047*** 0.003  -0.028*** -0.027*** 0.000 
 (-3.529) (-4.499) (0.273)  (-3.529) (-3.067) (0.0244) 
PMC*D*RET 0.059*** 0.123*** -0.056**  0.059*** 0.056*** 0.004 
 (3.387) (5.435) (-2.019)  (3.387) (2.767) (0.116) 
Country/Industry/
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 84835 52449 32386  84835 73234 11601 
Adj. R-squared 0.233 0.249 0.224  0.233 0.229 0.240 
 
This table presents the regression coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics from estimating equation (2) 
in strong- and weak-legal subsamples. Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix 1-A. For brevity, I only 
report the coefficients for the items important to my research questions, and the coefficients of other variables 
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are omitted in the tables. Other control variables include firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, and 
litigation risk. This table presents robust (clustered) t-statistics in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1). 
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Table 4 Evidences on whether the association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism is nonmonotonic 
 
Panel A: Strong Security Regulation 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
RET + -0.049*** -0.109*** -0.091** -0.041* 
  (-3.184) (-3.061) (-2.204) (-1.854) 
D*RET  + 0.332*** 0.516*** 0.302*** 0.278*** 
  (13.26) (8.729) (3.632) (7.505) 
PMC*RET - -0.046*** -0.149 -0.773*** -0.029** 
  (-4.391) (-0.666) (-3.177) (-1.967) 
PMC*D*RET + 0.124*** 1.986*** 0.282 0.065** 
  (5.538) (4.321) (0.540) (2.052) 
Country/Industry/Year 
fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  53085 13227 11650 28208 
Adj. R-squared  0.250 0.282 0.281 0.235 
 
Panel B: Weak Security Regulation 
RET + 0.054*** 0.036* 0.039 0.063** 
  (3.516) (1.842) (0.723) (2.000) 
D*RET  + 0.152*** 0.177*** 0.092 0.178*** 
  (5.304) (4.330) (0.830) (3.033) 
PMC*RET - 0.005 -0.210 0.097 -0.012 
  (0.380) (-1.131) (0.306) (-0.621) 
PMC*D*RET + -0.073*** 0.764* -0.228 -0.044 
  (-2.614) (1.884) (-0.335) (-1.018) 
Country/Industry/Year 
fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  31750 13915 6074 11761 
Adj. R-squared  0.219 0.218 0.232 0.251 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Strong Public Enforcement 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
RET + -0.053*** -0.115*** -0.091** -0.052** 
  (-3.419) (-2.919) (-2.197) (-2.357) 
D*RET  + 0.342*** 0.533*** 0.312*** 0.299*** 
  (13.45) (8.214) (3.700) (8.071) 
PMC*RET - -0.048*** -0.196 -0.775*** -0.037** 
  (-4.494) (-0.761) (-3.175) (-2.521) 
PMC*D*RET + 0.129*** 2.272*** 0.292 0.077** 
  (5.677) (4.417) (0.552) (2.476) 
Country/Industry/Year 
fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  49047 11636 11194 26217 
Adj. R-squared  0.248 0.280 0.279 0.233 
 
Panel D: Weak Public Enforcement 
RET + 0.050*** 0.027 0.031 0.079*** 
  (3.446) (1.479) (0.593) (2.683) 
D*RET  + 0.146*** 0.180*** 0.067 0.134** 
  (5.374) (4.583) (0.636) (2.478) 
PMC*RET - 0.001 -0.135 0.036 -0.003 
  (0.0707) (-0.821) (0.117) (-0.173) 
PMC*D*RET + -0.081*** 0.617* -0.333 -0.069 
  (-2.929) (1.706) (-0.516) (-1.546) 
Country/Industry/Year 
fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  35788 15506 6530 13752 
Adj. R-squared  0.224 0.221 0.234 0.251 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel E: Strong Investor Protection 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
RET + -0.052*** -0.110*** -0.081* -0.043* 
  (-3.339) (-3.039) (-1.900) (-1.926) 
D*RET  + 0.342*** 0.520*** 0.291*** 0.288*** 
  (13.41) (8.701) (3.427) (7.639) 
PMC*RET - -0.047*** -0.130 -0.707*** -0.029** 
  (-4.499) (-0.583) (-2.813) (-1.977) 
PMC*D*RET + 0.123*** 1.898*** 0.124 0.063** 
  (5.435) (4.170) (0.232) (1.969) 
Country/Industry/Year 
fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  52449 13242 11324 27883 
Adj. R-squared  0.249 0.281 0.277 0.234 
 
Panel F: Weak Investor Protection 
RET + 0.059*** 0.036* 0.023 0.067** 
  (3.948) (1.850) (0.397) (2.328) 
D*RET  + 0.137*** 0.179*** 0.147 0.147*** 
  (4.847) (4.413) (1.278) (2.653) 
PMC*RET - 0.003 -0.313* -0.098 -0.007 
  (0.273) (-1.725) (-0.304) (-0.378) 
PMC*D*RET + -0.056** 1.023** 0.230 -0.040 
  (-2.019) (2.551) (0.330) (-0.934) 
Country/Industry/Year 
fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  32386 13900 6400 12086 
Adj. R-squared  0.224 0.223 0.239 0.250 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel G: Strong Rule of Law 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
RET + -0.026** -0.034 -0.063* -0.026 
  (-2.047) (-1.582) (-1.713) (-1.197) 
D*RET  + 0.297*** 0.344*** 0.286*** 0.266*** 
  (14.10) (9.364) (3.914) (7.460) 
PMC*RET - -0.027*** 0.057 -0.511** -0.027** 
  (-3.067) (0.405) (-2.343) (-1.962) 
PMC*D*RET + 0.056*** 0.932*** -0.032 0.024 
  (2.767) (3.176) (-0.070) (0.780) 
Country/Industry/Year 
fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  73234 25448 15649 32137 
Adj. R-squared  0.229 0.240 0.252 0.228 
 
Panel H: Weak Rule of Law 
RET + 0.039 0.087 -0.124 0.021 
  (1.400) (1.563) (-1.480) (0.605) 
D*RET  + 0.137*** 0.134 0.507** 0.163** 
  (2.648) (1.207) (2.232) (2.431) 
PMC*RET - 0.000 0.010 -1.063** 0.003 
  (0.0244) (0.020) (-2.018) (0.139) 
PMC*D*RET + 0.004 0.372 3.323** 0.005 
  (0.116) (0.303) (2.370) (0.103) 
Country/Industry/Year 
fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  11601 1694 2075 7832 
Adj. R-squared  0.240 0.284 0.309 0.250 
 
This table presents the regression coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics from estimating 
equation (2) in three different groups (G1-G3) in the strong- and weak- legal institutions separately. 
Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix 1-A. For brevity, I only report the coefficients for the 
items important to my research questions, and the coefficients of other variables are omitted in the tables. 
Other control variables include firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, and litigation risk. The three 
groups (G1-G3) are divided according to the value of HHI. This table presents robust (clustered) 
t-statistics in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 5 Evidences on how product market competition affects the association between legal 
institutions and accounting conservatism  
 
Panel A: Legal Institution (LI) =Security Regulation 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
RET + -0.027* -0.044* -0.019 -0.035 
  (-1.883) (-1.881) (-0.617) (-1.583) 
D*RET  + 0.316*** 0.321*** 0.294*** 0.325*** 
  (12.96) (7.769) (5.638) (9.010) 
LI*RET - 0.003 -0.007 0.014 0.014 
  (0.478) (-0.800) (0.701) (1.107) 
LI*D*RET (b7) + -0.004 0.046* 0.022 -0.069*** 
  (-0.249) (1.770) (0.601) (-3.022) 
Industry/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  84835 27142 17724 39969 
Adj. R-squared  0.214 0.218 0.242 0.213 
P-value on b7 differences between G1 and G2: 0.000, G1 and G3: 0.000, G2 and G3: 0.000 
 
Panel B: Legal Institution (LI) =Public Enforcement 
RET + -0.021 -0.059** -0.007 -0.017 
  (-1.376) (-2.432) (-0.195) (-0.778) 
D*RET + 0.307*** 0.318*** 0.291*** 0.302*** 
  (12.49) (7.198) (4.819) (8.728) 
LI*RET - -0.002 0.008 0.002 -0.004 
  (-0.229) (0.692) (0.0732) (-0.279) 
LI*D*RET (b7) + 0.035* 0.047** 0.026 -0.027* 
  (1.881) (2.339)  (0.543) (-1.714) 
Industry/Year fixed 
effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  84835 27142 17724 39969 
Adj. R-squared  0.213 0.218 0.241 0.212 
P-value on b7 differences between G1 and G2: 0.008, G1 and G3: 0.012, G2 and G3: 0.004 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Legal Institution (LI) = Investor Protection 
                                          
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries  
RET + -0.008 -0.035 0.024 -0.016 
  (-0.570) (-1.488) (0.791) (-0.749) 
D*RET  + 0.278*** 0.308*** 0.261*** 0.263*** 
  (11.56) (7.876) (5.186) (7.253) 
LI*RET - -0.014** -0.016* -0.028 -0.004 
  (-2.055) (-1.872) (-1.502) (-0.394) 
LI*D*RET (b7) + 0.035** 0.059** 0.056 -0.007 
  (2.262) (2.488) (1.520) (-0.298) 
Industry/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  84835 27142 17724 39969 
Adj. R-squared  0.225 0.228 0.249 0.223 
P-value on b7 differences between G1 and G2: 0.008, G1 and G3: 0.002, G2 and G3: 0.024 
Panel D: Legal Institution (LI) =Rule of Law 
RET + 0.007 -0.003 0.021 0.003 
  (0.462) (-0.104) (0.772) (0.140) 
D*RET  + 0.228*** 0.256*** 0.243*** 0.181*** 
  (9.970) (5.513) (4.900) (5.654) 
LI*RET - -0.028*** -0.043*** -0.025 -0.023*** 
  (-3.993) (-2.782) (-1.523) (-2.602) 
LI*D*RET (b7) + 0.069*** 0.088** 0.062 0.065 
  (4.628) (2.488) (1.624) (1.552) 
Industry/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  84835 27142 17724 39969 
Adj. R-squared  0.223 0.227 0.248 0.221 
P-value on b7 differences between G1 and G2: 0.047, G1 and G3: 0.038, G2 and G3: 0.463 
 
This table presents the regression coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics from estimating 
equation (1) in three different groups (G1-G3). Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix 1-A. For 
brevity, I only report the coefficients for the items important to my research questions, and the 
coefficients of other variables are omitted in the tables. Other control variables include firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, leverage, litigation risk, and legal origin. The three groups (G1-G3) are divided 
according to the value of HHI. This table also provides the p-value on coefficient (b7) difference among 
the groups. This table presents robust (clustered) t-statistics in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1). 
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Table 6 Sensitivity Test - Reestimation using Ball & Shivakumar (2006) Model 
 
Table 6.1 Sensitivity tests on the association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism how it is affected by legal institutions - reestimation using Ball 
& Shivakumar (2006) Model 
 
Panel A: Legal institutions=Security law & Public Enforcement 
 Legal Institution=Security Law  Legal Institution=Public Enforcement 
Variable All firms Strong  Weak   All firms Strong  Weak  
CFO -0.442*** -0.471*** -0.426***  -0.442*** -0.391*** -0.446*** 
 (-34.73) (-16.91) (-27.28)  (-34.73) (-19.52) (-24.24) 
NCFO*CFO 0.341*** 0.377*** 0.303***  0.341*** 0.322* 0.257*** 
 (9.698) (6.382) (3.211)  (9.698) (7.731) (2.873) 
PMC*CFO 0.035 0.071** 0.041  0.035 0.092*** 0.000 
 (1.353) (2.058) (0.942)  (1.353) (2.876) (0.006) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO 0.124* 0.221** -0.008  0.124* 0.189** 0.046 
 (1.819) (2.393) (-0.068)  (1.819) (2.052) (0.345) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 74837 42969 31868  74837 48355 26482 
Adj. R-squared 0.596 0.570 0.529  0.596 0.588 0.511 
Panel B: Legal institutions=Investor Protection & Rule of Law 
 Legal Institution=Investor Protection  Legal Institution=Rule of Law 
Variable All firms Strong  Weak   All firms Strong  Weak  
CFO -0.442*** -0.326*** -0.470***  -0.442*** -0.433*** -0.455*** 
 (-34.73) (-14.25) (-28.93)  (-34.73) (-31.91) (-12.96) 
NCFO*CFO  0.341*** 0.318*** 0.268***  0.341*** 0.334*** -0.081 
 (9.698) (7.281) (2.965)  (9.698) (9.283) (-0.505) 
PMC*CFO 0.035 0.132* -0.026  0.035 0.057* 0.000 
 (1.353) (1.848) (-0.624)  (1.353) (1.950) (0.009) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO 0.124* 0.294** -0.009  0.124* 0.380*** -0.297 
 (1.819) (2.187) (-0.074)  (1.819) (3.114) (-1.245) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 74837 43976 30861  74837 64045 10792 
Adj. R-squared 0.596 0.587 0.519  0.596 0.600 0.590 
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Table 6.2 Sensitivity tests on whether the association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism is nonmonotonic - reestimation using Ball & Shivakumar (2006) 
Model 
 
Panel A: Strong Security Regulation 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
CFO + -0.471*** -0.360*** -0.215** -0.428*** 
  (-16.91) (-9.716) (-2.232) (-12.02) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.377*** 0.486*** -0.118 0.044 
  (6.382) (6.839) (-0.471) (0.345) 
PMC*CFO - 0.071** 0.436 1.099* 0.009 
  (2.058) (0.620) (1.830) (0.206) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO + 0.221** 0.336*** -0.799 0.122 
  (2.393) (3.981) (-1.427) (0.849) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  42969 12958 11342 24055 
Adj. R-squared  0.570 0.582 0.583 0.514 
 
Panel B: Weak Security Regulation 
CFO + -0.426*** -0.469*** -0.488*** -0.373*** 
  (-27.28) (-11.97) (-3.066) (-9.630) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.303*** 0.371*** 0.119 0.480 
  (3.211) (3.541) (0.248) (1.609) 
PMC*CFO - 0.041 -0.270 0.011 0.080 
  (0.942) (-0.373) (0.0102) (1.160) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO + 0.208 0.281** -0.282 0.307 
  (0.068) (2.175) (-0.667) (1.580) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  31868 11911 4742 9829 
Adj. R-squared  0.529 0.580 0.575 0.554 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Strong Public Enforcement 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
CFO + -0.391*** -0.465*** -0.294*** -0.450*** 
  (-19.52) (-9.942) (-2.781) (-9.683) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.322* 0.347*** 0.269 0.179 
  (7.731) (5.942) (1.081) (1.001) 
PMC*CFO - 0.092*** 1.156 0.891 -0.003 
  (2.876) (1.439) (1.458) (-0.0655) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO + 0.489** 0.554*** 0.739* 0.176 
  (2.052) (4.818) (1.845) (1.198) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  48355 10843 10754 21372 
Adj. R-squared  0.588 0.553 0.576 0.599 
 
Panel D: Weak Public Enforcement 
CFO + -0.446*** -0.452*** -0.391*** -0.380*** 
  (-24.24) (-13.77) (-2.683) (-11.11) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.257*** 0.148*** -0.203 0.412*** 
  (2.873) (3.448) (-0.433) (4.096) 
PMC*CFO - 0.000 -0.576 0.487 0.089 
  (0.006) (-0.926) (0.469) (1.450) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO + 0.046 0.480** -0.218 -0.214 
  (0.345) (1.961) (-1.273) (-1.197) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  26482 14026 5330 12512 
Adj. R-squared  0.511 0.251 0.256 0.228 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel E: Strong Investor Protection 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
CFO + -0.326*** -0.232*** -0.190* -0.415*** 
  (-14.25) (-5.165) (-1.803) (-10.99) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.318*** 0.444*** -0.442 0.054 
  (7.281) (5.289) (-1.544) (0.383) 
PMC*CFO - 0.132* 1.393* 1.087* 0.023 
  (1.848) (1.776) (1.701) (0.475) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO + 0.294** 0.512*** -0.656 0.117 
  (2.187) (4.810) (-1.291) (0.798) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  43976 10863 10505 22608 
Adj. R-squared  0.587 0.584 0.585 0.611 
 
Panel F: Weak Investor Protection 
CFO + -0.470*** -0.514*** -0.453*** -0.399*** 
  (-28.93) (-15.45) (-3.469) (-11.39) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.268*** 0.275*** 0.028 0.405*** 
  (2.965) (2.923) (0.0678) (4.009) 
PMC*CFO - -0.026 -0.983 0.276 0.047 
  (-0.624) (-1.575) (0.299) (0.797) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO + -0.009 0.435* -0.319 0.136 
  (-0.074) (1.960) (-1.123) (0.744) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  30861 14006 5579 11276 
Adj. R-squared  0.519 0.237 0.267 0.215 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel G: Strong Rule of Law 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
CFO + -0.433*** -0.451*** -0.340*** -0.422*** 
  (-31.91) (-16.75) (-4.174) (-15.11) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.334*** 0.363*** 0.050 0.405* 
  (9.283) (5.910) (0.283) (1.704) 
PMC*CFO - 0.057* -0.394 0.832 0.017 
  (1.950) (-0.806) (1.475) (0.408) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO + 0.380*** 0.349*** -2.410** 0.196* 
  (3.114) (4.362) (-2.069) (1.745) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  64045 22827 14259 26959 
Adj. R-squared  0.600 0.222 0.195 0.207 
 
Panel H: Weak Rule of Law 
CFO + -0.455*** -0.455*** -0.339 -0.435*** 
  (-12.96) (-5.051) (-1.611) (-8.428) 
NCFO*CFO  + -0.081 0.360* -0.893 -0.230 
  (-0.505) (1.890) (-1.133) (-0.962) 
PMC*CFO - 0.000 0.981 1.292 0.018 
  (0.009) (0.593) (0.970) (0.251) 
PMC*NCFO*CFO + -0.297 0.253* -0.385 -0.570** 
  (-1.245) (1.868) (-0.936) (-2.061) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  10792 2042 1825 6925 
Adj. R-squared  0.590 0.338 0.344 0.296 
 
This table presents the regression coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics from estimating 
equation (3). Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix 1-A. For brevity, I only report the 
coefficients for the items important to my research questions, and the coefficients of other variables are 
omitted in the tables. Other control variables include firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, and 
litigation risk. The three groups (G1-G3) are divided according to the value of HHI. This table presents 
robust (clustered) t-statistics in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 6.3 Sensitivity tests on how product market competition affects the association 
between legal institutions and accounting conservatism - reestimation using Ball & 
Shivakumar (2006) Model 
 
Panel A: Legal Institution (LI) =Security Regulation 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
CFO - -0.459*** -0.443*** -0.513*** -0.449*** 
  (-32.97) (-20.76) (-17.62) (-20.87) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.347*** 0.410*** 0.431*** 0.373*** 
  (10.04) (7.197) (5.823) (4.543) 
LI*CFO - 0.038* 0.055* 0.122** 0.009 
  (1.756) (1.662) (2.202) (0.278) 
LI*NCFO*CFO + 0.343*** 0.425*** -0.297 -0.354 
  (3.510) (4.143) (-1.451) (-1.428) 
Industry/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  74837 24869 16084 33884 
Adj. R-squared  0.596 0.616 0.695 0.607 
 
Panel B: Legal Institution (LI) =Public Enforcement 
CFO - -0.441*** -0.417*** -0.474*** -0.440*** 
  (-36.82) (-23.49) (-17.22) (-23.58) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.288*** 0.376*** 0.346*** 0.322*** 
  (8.810) (8.218) (6.653) (3.786) 
LI*CFO - -0.020 -0.100** 0.042 0.013 
  (-0.774) (-2.380) (0.664) (0.415) 
LI*NCFO*CFO + 0.238 0.246** 0.205 -0.204** 
  (1.515) (3.098) (1.164) (-2.153) 
Industry/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  74837 24869 16084 33884 
Adj. R-squared  0.596 0.617 0.685 0.603 
 
64 
 
Table 6.1 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Legal Institution (LI) = Investor Protection 
                                          
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries  
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries  
CFO - -0.468*** -0.469*** -0.492*** -0.451*** 
  (-37.20) (-25.31) (-19.11) (-22.50) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.336*** 0.285*** 0.383*** 0.348*** 
  (10.36) (8.554) (5.493) (5.200) 
LI*CFO - 0.079*** 0.146*** 0.065 0.028 
  (4.002) (4.537) (1.379) (1.038) 
LI*NCFO*CFO + 0.262*** 0.527*** 0.121 0.213 
  (3.513) (3.724) (-0.565) (1.271) 
Industry/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  74837 24869 16084 33884 
Adj. R-squared  0.596 0.617 0.695 0.605 
 
Panel D: Legal Institution (LI) =Rule of Law 
CFO - -0.451*** -0.453*** -0.506*** -0.419*** 
  (-22.75) (-11.39) (-7.81) (-6.54) 
NCFO*CFO  + 0.258*** 0.317*** 0.234* 0.254* 
  (3.577) (9.423) (1.812) (1.681) 
LI*CFO - 0.005 0.019 0.037 -0.024 
  (0.237) (0.482) (0.963) (-0.973) 
LI*NCFO*CFO + 0.386*** 0.419*** 0.314 0.295 
  (5.423) (7.011) (1.420) (0.624) 
Industry/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  74837 24869 16084 33884 
Adj. R-squared  0.607 0.619 0.604 0.619 
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Table 7 Sensitivity Test – Including other measures of product market competition 
Table 7.1 Sensitivity tests on the association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism and how it is affected by legal institutions – including other 
measures of product market competition 
 
Panel A: Legal institutions=Security law & Public Enforcement 
 Legal Institution=Security Law  Legal Institution=Public Enforcement 
Variable All firms Strong  Weak   All firms Strong  Weak  
DIFF*D*RET 0.026 -0.005 0.014  0.026 -0.006 0.016 
 (1.481) (-0.206) (0.421)  (1.481) (-0.232) (0.462) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  0.013*** 0.014** -0.003  0.013*** 0.011* -0.006 
 (2.986) (2.195) (-0.497)  (2.986) (1.785) (-0.911) 
ENTCOST*D*RET -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.004  -0.014*** -0.015** -0.003 
 (-3.291) (-2.625) (-0.646)  (-3.291) (-2.401) (-0.444) 
PMC*D*RET 0.078*** 0.110*** -0.026  0.078*** 0.110*** -0.029 
 (3.315) (3.689) (-0.704)  (3.315) (3.559) (-0.808) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 60250 37937 22313  60250 35680 24570 
Adj. R-squared 0.214 0.232 0.204  0.214 0.228 0.213 
Panel B: Legal institutions=Investor Protection & Rule of Law 
 Legal Institution=Investor Protection  Legal Institution=Rule of Law 
Variable All firms Strong  Weak   All firms Strong  Weak  
DIFF*D*RET 0.026 -0.008 0.014  0.026 0.029 -0.020 
 (1.481) (-0.275) (0.433)  (1.481) (1.624) (-0.345) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  0.013*** 0.015** 0.001  0.013*** 0.018*** 0.003 
 (2.986) (2.170) (0.194)  (2.986) (3.513) (0.318) 
ENTCOST*D*RET -0.014*** -0.015** -0.007  -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.008 
 (-3.291) (-2.285) (-1.050)  (-3.291) (-3.442) (-0.838) 
PMC*D*RET 0.078*** 0.121*** -0.031  0.078*** 0.083*** -0.006 
 (3.315) (3.920) (-0.882)  (3.315) (3.065) (-0.121) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 60250 35512 24738  60250 50056 10194 
Adj. R-squared 0.214 0.235 0.204  0.214 0.217 0.211 
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Table 7.2 Sensitivity tests on whether the association between product market competition and 
accounting conservatism is nonmonotonic – including other measures of product market 
competition 
 
Panel A: Strong Security Regulation 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
DIFF*D*RET + -0.005 -0.171*** -0.251** 0.050 
  (-0.206) (-2.817) (-2.540) (1.255) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  + 0.014** 0.021* 0.020 0.006 
  (2.195) (1.943) (1.532) (0.612) 
ENTCOST*D*RET - -0.016*** -0.034*** -0.030** -0.001 
  (-2.625) (-3.204) (-2.390) (-0.0939) 
PMC*D*RET + 0.110*** 1.613*** -0.395 0.039 
  (3.689) (3.107) (-0.706) (0.899) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  37937 11154 8474 18309 
Adj. R-squared  0.232 0.278 0.274 0.215 
 
Panel B: Weak Security Regulation 
DIFF*D*RET + -0.014 -0.164* -0.472 0.102 
  (-0.421) (-1.967) (-1.111) (0.744) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  + 0.003 0.016 0.021 -0.011 
  (0.497) (1.403) (1.277) (-1.111) 
ENTCOST*D*RET - -0.004 -0.027* -0.010 0.009 
  (-0.646) (-1.997) (-0.567) (0.824) 
PMC*D*RET + -0.026 1.021** 1.046 -0.023 
  (-0.704) (2.049) (1.279) (-0.444) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  22313 8926 4752 8635 
Adj. R-squared  0.204 0.220 0.210 0.241 
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Table 7.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Strong Public Enforcement 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
DIFF*D*RET + -0.006 -0.191*** -0.255** 0.038 
  (-0.232) (-2.980) (-2.526) (1.087) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  + 0.011* 0.025** 0.015 0.005 
  (1.785) (2.071) (1.061) (0.515) 
ENTCOST*D*RET - -0.015** -0.039*** -0.030** -0.001 
  (-2.401) (-3.322) (-2.148) (-0.154) 
PMC*D*RET + 0.110*** 2.148*** -0.232 0.046 
  (3.559) (3.605) (-0.408) (1.058) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  35680 9988 8195 17497 
Adj. R-squared  0.228 0.273 0.272 0.214 
 
Panel D: Weak Public Enforcement 
DIFF*D*RET + 0.016 -0.191* 0.317 0.005 
  (0.462) (-1.808) (1.550) (0.135) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  + 0.006 0.015* 0.009 -0.013 
  (0.911) (1.880) (0.652) (-1.213) 
ENTCOST*D*RET - -0.003 -0.024 -0.005 0.010 
  (-0.444) (-1.394) (-0.325) (0.981) 
PMC*D*RET + -0.029 0.807* 0.782 -0.023 
  (-0.808) (1.747) (0.992) (-0.431) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  24570 10092 5031 9447 
Adj. R-squared  0.213 0.226 0.209 0.242 
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Table 7.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel E: Strong Investor Protection 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
DIFF*D*RET + -0.008 -0.225*** -0.252** 0.049 
  (-0.275) (-3.677) (-2.562) (1.146) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  + 0.015** 0.024** 0.022 0.009 
  (2.170) (2.046) (1.631) (0.929) 
ENTCOST*D*RET - -0.015** -0.036*** -0.032** -0.002 
  (-2.285) (-3.027) (-2.500) (-0.180) 
PMC*D*RET + 0.121*** 2.304*** -0.465 0.045 
  (3.920) (4.110) (-0.798) (1.018) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  35512 10080 7925 17507 
Adj. R-squared  0.235 0.290 0.272 0.218 
 
Panel F: Weak Investor Protection 
DIFF*D*RET + -0.014 0.057 -0.279 0.003 
  (-0.433) (0.365) (-1.506) (0.082) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  + 0.001 0.007 0.018 -0.004 
  (0.194) (0.668) (1.187) (-0.429) 
ENTCOST*D*RET - -0.007 -0.027* -0.012 0.002 
  (-1.050) (-1.704) (-0.749) (0.227) 
PMC*D*RET + -0.031 0.925** 1.256* -0.040 
  (-0.882) (1.982) (1.649) (-0.805) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  24738 10012 5301 9425 
Adj. R-squared  0.204 0.216 0.216 0.231 
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Table 7.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel G: Strong Rule of Law 
                                              
Variable 
   
Sign All firms 
Competitive 
Industries 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
industries 
Highly 
concentrated 
industries 
DIFF*D*RET + 0.029 -0.115** -0.184** 0.049** 
  (1.624) (-1.967) (-2.188) (2.498) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  + -0.018*** -0.016** -0.025** -0.017** 
  (-3.513) (-2.025) (-2.275) (-2.067) 
ENTCOST*D*RET - 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.033*** 0.010 
  (3.442) (2.623) (3.035) (1.264) 
PMC*D*RET + 0.083*** 1.221*** -0.650 0.024 
  (3.065) (3.302) (-1.294) (0.614) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  50056 17813 11494 20749 
Adj. R-squared  0.217 0.239 0.239 0.221 
 
Panel H: Weak Rule of Law 
DIFF*D*RET + -0.020 -0.045 -0.236 -0.041 
  (-0.345) (-0.263) (-0.701) (-0.632) 
MKTSIZE*D*RET  + 0.003 -0.004 0.018 0.006 
  (0.318) (-0.199) (0.441) (0.397) 
ENTCOST*D*RET - -0.008 0.012* 0.009 -0.018 
  (-0.838) (1.711) (0.259) (-1.333) 
PMC*D*RET + -0.006 0.156** 3.226** -0.014 
  (-0.121) (2.240) (2.249) (-0.222) 
Country/Industry 
/Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  10194 2267 1732 6195 
Adj. R-squared  0.211 0.316 0.309 0.214 
 
This table presents the regression coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics from replicating the 
empirical tests in Table 4 and Table 5 by including three dimensions of product market competition 
proposed by Karuna (2007) in the regressions. Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix 1-A. For 
brevity, I only report the coefficients for the items important to my research questions, and the 
coefficients of other variables are omitted in the tables. The three groups (G1-G3) are divided according 
to the value of HHI. This table presents robust (clustered) t-statistics in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Chapter Two: Ownership Structure, Legal Institutions and Accounting 
Conservatism 
2.1 Introduction 
Accounting conservatism is an important research topic because it is regarded as an 
important tool to improve contracting efficiency and assuage agency problems (Watts 
2003). Recently, many studies empirically investigate how accounting conservatism is 
applied to assuage agency problems (Ahmed, et al. 2002, Ahmed and Duellman 2007, 
Lafond and Roychowdhury 2008, LaFond and Watts 2008, Wang 2006, Zhang 2008). In 
the ultimate ownership literature, prior studies reveal the wedge between controlling 
shareholder’s control rights and cash-flow rights (wedge hereafter) create agency problem 
between minority and majority shareholders(Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 2002, 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002). Moreover, Laeven and Levine 
(2008) document the popularity of firms controlled by multiple large shareholders and 
significant effects of dispersion of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners (dispersion 
of cash-flow rights hereafter) on agency costs and thus firm valuation. Based on the above 
studies, this paper attempts to extend prior literature by focusing on three research 
questions. First, how does the ownership structure characterized by a wedge between 
controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash-flow rights affect the use of accounting 
conservatism? Second, how does the ownership structure characterized by a dispersion of 
cash-flow rights affect the use of accounting conservatism? Finally, do the impacts of 
wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights on accounting conservatism vary with legal 
institutions? 
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Prior corporate governance literature identifies three different kinds of ownership 
structures: (1) 100 percent small shareholders, (2) one large controlling owner combined 
with many small shareholders, and (3) multiple large shareholders combined with many 
other small shareholders. In the first case, managers may behave opportunistically and 
divert corporate resources for private benefits (Grossman and Hart 1980, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In the second case, the large shareholder acts to assuage the interest 
conflicts between managers and shareholders, but it creates agency problem between 
controlling owner and minority shareholders as stressed by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), and others. While in the last case, multiple 
large shareholders could either cross-monitor each other or organize coalition to extract 
private benefits together. Many prior studies have investigated how the 
manager-shareholder conflicts drive the use of accounting conservatism, while this paper 
focuses on agency problems driven by the conflicts between majority and minority 
shareholders. 
The separation of cash-flow rights from voting rights is pervasive around the world 
(Claessens, et al. 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002, La Porta, et al. 1999). In firms with 
concentrated ownership, the primary agency problem arises from interest conflicts between 
minority shareholders and controlling owners who directly manage the firm or internalize 
the benefits from monitoring managers and who possess more control rights than cash flow 
rights. A smaller fraction of the firm’s cash flow rights relative to control rights fails to 
align the controller’s incentives with those of minority shareholders. As a result, controlling 
owners have both incentives and the ability to enjoy private control benefits
16
 that are not 
                                                 
16 For example, perquisite consumption, empire building, excessive managerial pay, appropriation of the 
firm’s opportunities and assets, and outright theft. 
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shared by minority shareholders in proportion to the shares they owned. Recognizing the 
risk of being expropriated by insiders, minority shareholders will react to the behavior of 
the controlling shareholder by discounting the valuation of the firm (Cheung, Rau and 
Stouraitis 2006, Claessens, et al. 2002, Lemmon and Lins 2003).  
Laeven and Levine (2008) find that one-third of publicly listed firms in Western 
Europe are controlled by multiple owners, stressing the importance of complex ownership 
structure involving multiple large shareholders
17
. Moreover, they document a negative 
relationship between corporate valuations and the dispersion of cash-flow rights. 
Theoretically, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) demonstrate that when cash-flow rights 
are distributed unevenly across large shareholders, the likelihood of a winning coalition 
with small cash-flow rights would be increased, leading to higher agency costs and lower 
firm value. Pagano and Roell (1998) argue that multiple large shareholders would 
cross-monitor each other, reducing agency costs and enhancing firm valuation. Furthermore, 
cross-monitoring among large shareholders suggested by Pagano and Roell (1998) is less 
likely to happen when cash-flow rights are unevenly distributed among controlling owners 
(Bloch and Hege 2001). This indicates that the association between cash-flow rights 
dispersion and agency costs is positive. In sum, these studies indicate that dispersion of 
cash-flow rights positively related to agency costs and negatively related to firm valuation. 
The above discussion indicates that both wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights are 
associated with more serious agency problems and that minority shareholders are aware of 
the risk of expropriation by controlling owners and respond rationally. Extant literature 
identifies accounting conservatism as a tool to improve contracting efficiency and 
                                                 
17 In the U.S., Gomes and Novaes (1999) point out that 57.2% of the closely held corporations listed in the 
National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) with annual sales above 10 million dollars have more 
than one large shareholder. 
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governance firm insiders (Holthausen and Watts 2001, Watts 2003). For example, LaFond 
and Roychowdhury (2008) document that the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders could drive the use of accounting conservatism. Similarly, LaFond and Watts 
(2008) argue that agency problems induced by information asymmetry between firm insiders 
and outside equity investors drive the use of accounting conservatism in financial statements. In 
another study, Ahmed, et al. (2002) find that firms that face more severe conflicts between 
shareholders and bondholders tend to use more conservative accounting. Furthermore, Ahmed 
and Duellman (2007) argue that accounting conservatism could assist directors to reduce 
agency costs of firms. Based on these results, I expect that the agency problem induced by 
the wedge between control rights or the dispersion of cash-flow rights could drive higher 
demand for accounting conservatism from outsiders (both minority shareholders and 
debtholders). At the same time, insiders also have incentive to increase firm value and lower 
the cost of financing through satisfying the demand from outsiders. From this aspect, wedge 
and dispersion of cash-flow rights are expected to be positively associated with accounting 
conservatism. However, controlling shareholders of firms with wedge or dispersion of 
cash-flow rights possess incentives and ability to extract private benefits. Therefore, the desire 
to avoid external monitoring and loss of reputation induces insiders to mask their appropriation 
or tunneling behavior by managing, especially favorably biasing, reported accounting income 
(Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu 2004, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003). As a result, the demand for 
higher accounting conservatism from outsiders can be attenuated by the insiders’ incentive to 
mask appropriation or tunneling behaviors and hence supply less conservatism. Overall, the 
analysis above provides competing and alternative predictions about the effects of wedge and 
dispersion of cash-flow rights on accounting conservatism. Since prior studies generally find 
that the effects from demand side (to assuage agency problems) dominate those from supply 
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side (to hide misbehaviors) (Ahmed, et al. 2002, Lafond and Roychowdhury 2008, LaFond and 
Watts 2008), I predict that both wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights are positively 
associated with accounting conservatism.  
Legal institutions could influence the relation between ownership structure and accounting 
conservatism in two ways. On the one hand, legal institutions could affect the demand and 
supply of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 2007). 
Firms cost more to launch better governance mechanisms (including creating conservative 
accounting and building reputation for accounting conservatism) and benefit less from 
doing so in countries with weak legal institutions. In line of this logic, insiders of these 
firms have limited (strengthened) incentive to supply accounting conservatism in weak 
(strong) legal institutions. Recognizing the incentives of the insiders, outsiders (both 
minority shareholders and debtholders) in weak legal institutions would be less likely to 
trust the effectiveness of governance mechanisms set up by the insiders and thus rely less 
on corporate governance when encountering agency problems, leading to a lower demand 
for corporate governance in these countries. Therefore, legal institutions impact on both 
demand and supply of corporate governance, including accounting conservatism. From this 
aspect, legal institutions strengthen the positive association between wedge/dispersion of 
cash-flow rights and accounting conservatism.  
On the other hand, well-functioning legal institutions limit insiders’ private control 
benefits by making wealth expropriation legally riskier and more expensive (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2000, Nenova 2003). This occurs because the likelihood 
of being revealed and sued reduces the incentives and capacities of controlling owners to 
extract private control benefits. Thus, the behavior of managing, especially favorably biasing, 
reported accounting income in response to control divergence and dispersion of cash-flow 
75 
 
rights is likely to be reduced when investors are protected by strong legal institutions (Bushman 
and Piotroski 2006, Haw, et al. 2004). However, it is also possible that the demand for 
accounting conservatism from outsiders is attenuated by the strong legal institutions, because 
the risk of expropriation by insiders is lowered. Therefore, from this aspect, whether legal 
institutions strengthen the positive association between wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights 
and accounting conservatism depends on which effects dominate. Overall, based on the above 
discussion, I predict that legal institutions strengthen the positive association between 
wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights and accounting conservatism. 
In this paper, I use the Basu’s (1997) methodology to capture the extent of accounting 
conservatism. Using a comprehensive, firm-level ownership dataset for thirteen Western 
European countries, I provide evidence that accounting conservatism is positively associated 
with wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights after controlling for the level of cash-flow rights 
held by the largest shareholder and other determinants of accounting conservatism. Moreover, 
the documented positive associations generally exist in strong legal institutions (proxied by 
shareholder rights, investor protection, and judiciary efficiency), indicating the importance of 
legal institutions in influencing the demand and supply of accounting conservatism. All these 
findings are robust to various sensitivity checks. These results are consistent with minority 
shareholders and bondholders demanding more accounting conservatism when the risk of 
insider expropriation is higher. The association between wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights 
and accounting conservatism is insignificant in countries with weak legal institutions, 
supporting the notion that it is costly to launch firm-specific governance mechanisms and build 
reputation in these countries.  
This study is different from previous studies in several aspects. LaFond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) document that accounting conservatism increases with the severity of 
the agency problem between managers and shareholders. Ahmed, et al. (2002) document that 
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firms that face more severe conflicts between shareholders and bondholders tend to use more 
conservative accounting. Distinct from the above studies, this study investigates the roles of 
accounting conservatism in mitigating the agency problem between majority shareholders and 
outsiders (including minority shareholders and debtholders). Secondly, in a closely related 
work, Haw et al. (2004) provide evidence of income management induced by the detachment of 
control rights from cash-flow rights of ultimate owners. One limitation of this study is that it 
only focuses on the react of managers to the expropriation behavior (e.g. increase the opacity of 
the firm) while neglects that of outsiders (e.g. increasing demand on information quality). 
Moreover, the consequence of ultimate ownership they investigate is earnings management 
proxied by the absolute value of discretionary accruals, which could also be used to signal 
private information (Subramanyam 1996). This essay directly examines the impact of 
ownership structure on one of the most important accounting choices – the level of accounting 
conservatism. Finally, this study explores the effects of the multiple large shareholders, in 
contrast to previous studies that have focused on the influences of the largest shareholder. This 
helps advance our understanding of the effects of ultimate ownership structure. 
This essay contributes to the extant literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it adds to the 
growing body of literature on the role of accounting conservatism in mitigating agency 
problems. The existing literature document that accounting conservatism helps mitigate the 
manager-shareholder and debtholder-shareholder conflicts, while this study stresses the role of 
accounting conservatism in alleviating another kind of agency problem: interest conflicts 
between majority shareholders and outsiders (both minority shareholders and debtholders).  
Secondly, this study highlights the importance of the multiple large shareholders in 
affecting the level of accounting conservatism. Previous studies on accounting consequences of 
ownership structure generally neglect the effects of multiple large shareholders. Prior finance 
and economics literature reveal that multiple large owners could either cross-monitor or build 
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coalition and affect the firm’s agency costs and valuation, suggesting that it is important to 
study the behavior of multiple large shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000, Bloch and 
Hege 2001, Laeven and Levine 2008, Pagano and Roell 1998). To my knowledge, this study is 
the first to investigate the effects of the distribution of cash-flow rights among multiple large 
shareholders on accounting conservatism.  
Thirdly, this essay reinforces the important role played by legal institutions in influencing 
the installation of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms. The findings of this paper are 
consistent with the argument that legal institutions are important in determining the costs and 
benefits of launching firm-level governance mechanisms. 
Finally, the findings of this study have important implications for accounting standard 
setters attempting to eliminate conservatism in financial reports. My finding that accounting 
conservatism increases with interest conflicts between minority shareholders and insiders 
implies that accounting conservatism is a useful tool to assuage such interest conflicts. This 
finding reminds standard setters to take caution when they attempt to eliminate accounting 
conservatism. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature 
and develops the research hypotheses. Section 2.3 specifies the research designs. Section 
2.4 describes sample and provides descriptive statistics. Empirical results are presented in 
Section 2.5. Section 2.6 reports robustness checks and Section 2.7 concludes. Appendix 
2-A includes a description of all empirical variables and their sources. 
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Accounting Conservatism 
 
Accounting conservatism is widely accepted as a tool to improve contracting efficiency 
and governance firm insiders (Holthausen and Watts 2001, Watts 2003). For example, when the 
severity of agency problems between managers and shareholders increases, managers would 
select higher level of accounting conservatism to lower the agency costs (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury 2008). Ahmed and Duellman (2007) argue that accounting conservatism 
could assist directors to reduce agency costs of firms. In another study, Ahmed, et al. (2002) 
document that firms that face more severe conflicts between shareholders and bondholders tend 
to use more conservative accounting. Moreover, LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that agency 
problems induced by information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside equity investors 
drive the use of accounting conservatism in financial statements. The findings of the above 
studies indicate that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating agency 
problems between insiders (such as managers and controlling shareholders) and outsiders (such 
as minority shareholders and debtholders). Below, I briefly discuss how accounting 
conservatism functions in reducing agency costs.  
According to the agency theory, insiders possess more information than outsiders as 
well as motivations to favorably bias the information they supply to outsiders and take 
actions (such as asset substitution, consumption of perquisites, and empire building) that 
result in deadweight losses (Jensen and Meckling 1976). By requiring higher veriﬁcation 
standards for recognition of gains, accounting conservatism reduces managers’ ability and 
incentives to withhold information on expected losses, inflate earnings or overstate net 
79 
 
assets (Ahmed, et al. 2002, Holthausen and Watts 2001, Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 
Watts 2003). Therefore, accounting conservatism could improve contracting efficiency and 
eventually increase firm value. 
Accounting conservatism is also regarded as an important corporate governance 
mechanism in monitoring insiders (Bushman, et al. 2007, Watts 2003). Bushman et al. 
(2007) argue that conservatism facilitates identifying negative NPV projects or poorly 
performing investments, thus helping to improve investment efficiency. Therefore, 
accounting conservatism helps effectively oversee the managers, limit deadweight losses 
from poor investment decisions, and increase ﬁrm valuation. In addition, conservatism 
could also remind debtholders of the possible unfavorable situation earlier and help them 
make liquidation decisions correctly (Li 2009, Zhang 2008). Based on the above 
discussions, accounting conservatism functions as a monitoring mechanism of insiders, and 
is an important feature of corporate governance (Ball, et al. 2000). 
Finally, accounting conservatism could also improve the accuracy of information provided 
by insiders and enhance the welfare of accounting information users. Fan and Zhang (2007) 
argue that, information originator’s expected payoff decreases with a conservative accounting 
system, because she prefers to be classified into the favorable state of affairs. Such a decrease, 
however, is lower when the underlying information signal is more precise. Therefore, an 
increased level of accounting conservatism promotes the information producer’s motivation to 
offer accurate information. Similarly, Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang (2007) argue that imposing a 
conservative noise on the accounting system dampens manager’s incentive to optimistically 
bias earnings. Overall, prior studies indicate that accounting conservatism motivates insiders to 
provide accurate accounting information. 
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The above discussion suggests that accounting information helps mitigate the agency 
problem between insiders and outsiders. To my knowledge, there is no study investigating 
whether accounting conservatism is applied to assuage the agency problem between controlling 
shareholders (including both the largest owner and the second largest owner) and outsiders 
(including both minority shareholders and debtholders). In particular, I empirically explore 
three research questions. Firstly, how does wedge affect the use of accounting conservatism? 
Secondly, how does dispersion of cash-flow rights affect the use of accounting 
conservatism? Thirdly, do the impacts of wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights on 
accounting conservatism vary with legal institutions? 
 
2.2.2 Ownership structure and Accounting Conservatism 
 
This study concentrates on two important dimensions of ownership structure: wedge 
between control rights and cash-flow rights and dispersion of cash-flow rights between the two 
largest shareholders. Concentrated ownership characterized by the detachment of cash flow 
rights from voting rights is the most common form of ownership structure in listed 
corporations around the world (Claessens, et al. 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002, La Porta, et al. 
1999). Recent study indicates that even in the U.S., the corporate ownership is concentrated 
(Holderness 2009). Furthermore, prior studies also reveal the popularity of complex 
ownership structure involving multiple large owners (Gomes and Novaes 1999, Laeven and 
Levine 2008). Recently, Laeven and Levine (2008) document that one-third of publicly 
listed firms in Western Europe are controlled by more than one controlling shareholder, 
stressing the importance of complex ownership structure involving multiple large owners. 
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Therefore, it is important to investigate how the two important dimensions of ownership 
structure – wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights – shape accounting conservatism. 
In firms with wedge, the primary agency problem arises from conflicts of interest between 
minority shareholders and controlling owners who directly manage the firm or internalizes the 
benefits from monitoring managers and who frequently possess more control rights than 
cash-flow rights. Large shareholders have incentives to maximize their own benefits at the cost 
of other shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). A smaller fraction of the firm’s cash-flow 
rights relative to control rights fails to align controller’s incentives with those of minority 
shareholders. Therefore, when wedge exists, controlling owners possess incentives and the 
ability to extract private control benefits (e.g., perquisite consumption, excessive managerial 
pay, appropriation of the firm’s opportunities and assets, and outright theft) that are not shared 
by minority shareholders in proportion to the shares they owned. Knowing the incentives of 
insiders, minority shareholders will react to the behavior of insiders by discounting the 
valuation of the firm (Cheung, et al. 2006, Claessens, et al. 2002, Lemmon and Lins 2003). 
In sum, wedge is expected to be positively associated with agency costs caused by the 
conflicts between insiders and outsiders. 
Dispersion of cash-flow rights also affects agency costs and firm valuation. Bennedsen 
and Wolfenzon (2000) argue that in equilibrium the association between corporate valuation 
and dispersion of cash-flow rights should be negative. The logics behind their predictions are: 
(1) incentives to expropriate corporate resources for private gain are lower for ruling coalitions 
with high cash-flow rights because of alignment effects (2) ruling coalitions with high 
cash-flow rights are less likely to form when the dispersion of cash-flow rights is high. 
Therefore, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) conclude that when cash-flow rights are 
distributed unevenly across large shareholders, the likelihood of a winning coalition with 
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small cash-flow rights would be increased, leading to higher agency costs and lower firm 
value. Pagano and Roell (1998) argue that multiple large shareholders would cross-monitor 
each other, reducing agency costs and enhancing firm valuation. Bloch and Hege (2001) 
further show that cross-monitoring is less likely when cash-flow rights are unevenly 
distributed, which indicates a positive association between cash-flow rights dispersion and 
agency costs. Recently, Laeven and Levine (2008) document a negative relationship 
between corporate valuation and dispersion of cash-flow rights, consistent with the 
predictions of prior theoretical models. Overall, the above studies indicate that, similar to 
wedge, dispersion of cash-flow rights is expected to be positively associated with agency 
costs caused by the interest conflicts between insiders and outsiders.  
Extant literature suggests that accounting conservatism helps mitigate the agency 
problem between insiders and outsiders. For example, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) 
document that the agency problem between managers and shareholders could drive the use of 
accounting conservatism. In another study, Ahmed, et al. (2002) find that firms that face more 
severe conflicts between shareholders and bondholders tend to use more conservative 
accounting. Furthermore, Ahmed and Duellman (2007) argue that accounting conservatism 
could assist directors to reduce agency costs of firms, and LaFond and Watts (2008) 
suggest that information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside equity investors 
generates accounting conservatism in financial statements. Based on prior studies, I expect 
the agency problem induced by wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights could drive higher 
demand for accounting conservatism from outsiders (both minority shareholders and 
debtholders). While insiders have incentive to enhance the firm value and lower the cost of 
financing through satisfying the outsiders’ demand for accounting conservatism. From this 
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aspect, both wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights are expected to be positively associated 
with accounting conservatism. 
While the above arguments are intuitively appealing and point to a positive association 
between wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights and accounting conservatism, there are contrary 
views on these relations. For firms with greater wedge or dispersion of cash-flow rights, 
controlling shareholders possess incentives and ability to extract private benefits. The desire to 
avoid external monitoring and loss of reputation induces insiders to mask their appropriation or 
tunneling behavior by managing, especially favorably biasing, reported accounting income 
(Haw, et al. 2004, Leuz, et al. 2003). Therefore, the effects of outsiders’ demand for higher 
accounting conservatism can be attenuated by the insiders’ incentive to mask appropriation or 
tunneling behavior.  
Overall, existing arguments provide competing and alternative predictions about the 
effects of wedge/cash-flow dispersion on accounting conservatism. However, since prior 
studies generally find that the effects from demand side (to assuage agency problems) dominate 
those from supply side (to hide misbehaviors) (Ahmed, et al. 2002, LaFond and Roychowdhury 
2008, LaFond and Watts 2008), I predict that both wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights are 
positively associated with accounting conservatism. Therefore, I get the following hypotheses:  
H1a: Accounting conservatism is positively related to wedge, ceteris paribus. 
H1b: Accounting conservatism is positively related to dispersion of cash-flow rights, 
ceteris paribus. 
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2.2.3 The Effects of Legal Institutions on the Relation between Ownership Structure and 
Accounting Conservatism 
 
Well-functioning legal institutions affect the cost-and-benefit of setting firm-level 
governance mechanisms and help limit the expropriation behavior of the insiders. Thus, legal 
institutions could influence the relationship between ownership structure and accounting 
conservatism. On the one hand, legal institutions could affect the demand and supply of 
firm-level corporate governance mechanism (Doidge, et al. 2007). Firms cost more to launch 
better corporate governance (including building reputation for accounting conservatism) 
and benefit less from doing so in countries with weak legal institutions. In this case, 
insiders of these firms have limited incentive to supply accounting conservatism. 
Recognizing the incentives of the insiders, outsiders (both minority shareholders and 
debtholders) in weak legal institutions would be less likely to trust the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms set up by the insiders and thus rely less on corporate governance 
when encountering agency problems, leading to a lower demand for corporate governance 
in these countries. Therefore, legal institutions affect both the supply and demand of 
corporate governance, including accounting conservatism, driven by agency problems. 
From this aspect, legal institutions strengthen the positive association between 
wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights and accounting conservatism. 
On the other hand, well-functioning legal institutions limit insiders’ private control 
benefits by making wealth expropriation legally riskier and more expensive (La Porta, et al. 
2000, Nenova 2003). This occurs because the likelihood of being revealed and sued reduces the 
incentives and capacities of controlling owners to extract private control benefits. Thus, the 
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behavior of managing, especially favorably biasing, reported accounting income in response to 
control wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights is likely to be reduced when investors are 
protected by strong, well-enforced legal institutions. However, it is also possible that the 
demand for accounting conservatism from outsiders is attenuated by the strong legal 
institutions, because the risk of expropriation by insiders is lowered. Therefore, from this aspect, 
whether legal institutions strengthen the positive association between wedge/dispersion of 
cash-flow rights and accounting conservatism depends on which effects dominate. 
Based on the above discussion, I predict that legal institutions strengthen the positive 
association between wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights and accounting conservatism. This 
leads to the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Legal institutions strengthen the positive association between wedge and accounting 
conservatism, ceteris paribus; 
H2b: Legal institutions strengthen the positive association between dispersion of cash-flow 
rights and accounting conservatism, ceteris paribus. 
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2.3 Research Design 
 
2.3.1 Measuring Accounting Conservatism 
There are two different ways to measure accounting conservatism. On the one hand, 
accounting conservatism could be measured as the timeliness of bad news recognition in 
earnings (losses) relative to the timeliness of good news recognition in earnings (gains) (see 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) for detailed discussion). On the other hand, Basu (1997) and 
others measure accounting conservatism as the incremental timeliness of bad news recognition 
over good news recognition. Following Bushman and Piotroski (2006), I measure accounting 
conservatism as the timeliness of good news recognition without impacting the incremental 
timeliness of bad news recognition, the timeliness of incremental bad news recognition alone, 
or the timeliness of both good news recognition and the incremental speed of bad news 
recognition simultaneously18. I use Basu’s (1997) model to capture the timeliness of good news 
and bad news recognition. 
 
2.3.2 Measuring Ownership Structure 
 
This study identifies three different dimensions of ownership structure: the largest 
controlling shareholder’s cash-flow rights (OWN), the largest shareholder’s wedge between 
control rights and cash-flow rights (Wedge), and dispersion of cash-flow rights between the 
largest shareholder and the second largest shareholder (Dispersion). A shareholder is defined as 
                                                 
18
 To see this definition clearly, let G be the speed of good news recognition and B the speed of bad news 
recognition, where B=G+I and I is incremental speed of bad news. Then conservatism =B/G=(G+I)/G=1+I/G. 
This implies that conservatism increases by increasing the incremental speed of bad news recognition holding 
the speed of good news recognition constant, decreasing the speed of good news recognition holding the 
incremental speed of bad news recognition constant, or slowing the speed of good news recognition and 
simultaneously increasing the speed of bad news recognition. See also Bushman and Piotroski (2006). 
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“large” if direct and indirect voting rights sum to 10 percent or more (La Porta et al. 1999). 
Following Laeven and Levine (2008), a firm is identified as widely-held if no shareholder holds 
10 percent of the voting rights19.  
Prior studies indicate that immediate ownership is insufficient for describing the complex 
ownership structure, such as stock pyramids, cross-holdings, and dual class shares (Claessens, 
et al. 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002, La Porta, et al. 1999). Following these studies, I use the 
ultimate owner approach to define cash-flow rights and control rights of the largest two 
shareholders. Indirect ownership chain is traced backwards through numerous corporations to 
identify the ultimate controlling owners.  
The control rights of the largest shareholder are calculated as the control rights of the 
largest shareholder with control of ten percent or more of the voting rights and zero if the 
corporation is widely held. The control rights of the second largest shareholder are calculated as 
the control rights of the second largest shareholder with control of ten percent or more of the 
voting rights and zero if the corporation is widely held, or if there is only one shareholder with 
control of ten percent or more of the voting rights. I also compute the direct and indirect 
cash-flow rights of the largest two shareholders. To calculate indirect cash-flow rights, I use the 
products of the cash-flow rights along the ownership chain. The cash-flow rights of the largest 
shareholder equals the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder that has control rights of ten 
percent or more and zero if the corporation is widely held. The cash-flow rights of the second 
largest shareholder equals the cash-flow rights of the second largest shareholder that has control 
rights of ten percent or more and zero if the corporation is widely held, or if there is only one 
shareholder with control rights of ten percent or more.  
I measure the wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights as the difference between 
control and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder. Wedge provides information on the 
                                                 
19 I get qualitatively same conclusions when applying a 20 percent criterion. 
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largest shareholder’s ability and incentives to expropriate firm resources. Similar results are 
obtained when using the ratio of cash-flow to control rights instead.  
To evaluate theories of the governance of firms with multiple blockholders, I compute the 
dispersion of cash-flow rights. Prior studies argue that ruling coalitions with large total 
cash-flow rights are less likely when cash-flow rights are widely distributed across large 
shareholders. Dispersion of cash-flow rights is computed as the difference between the 
cash-flow rights of the two largest shareholders. Noticeably, there are some firms (83 out of 
about 2,352) where dispersion of cash-flow rights is negative. This means there are a few firms 
in which the largest owner in terms of control rights has fewer cash-flow rights than the second 
largest owner. Following Laeven and Levine (2008), I simply exclude these firms from the 
empirical analysis20. 
 
2.3.3 Measuring Quality of Legal Institutions 
 
This study applies three different proxies measuring quality of legal institutions: 
Shareholder rights, investor protection, and judiciary efficiency. In the empirical analysis, I 
classify each country-level institution into high or low realization. The specific institution’s 
indicator variable is set equal to one if the country-level institution realization is greater than or 
equal to the median country-level observation, zero otherwise. The classification is an 
intertemporal constant in my study. The use of simple high-low institutional classification 
facilitates the comparison of the impacts of ownership structures on accounting conservatism 
among countries with different quality of legal institutions. The definitions and measurement 
methods of the three legal institution proxies are detailed in Appendix 2-A.  
                                                 
20 The empirical results are unchanged if I include these firms in the tests. 
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2.3.4 Investigating the Research Questions 
 
I modify Basu’s (1997) model to empirically examine my research questions. To test H1a 
and H1b, I regress the following model: 
NIt=a0+b1Dt+b2RETt+b3Dt*RETt 
+b4OWN+b5OWN*Dt+b6OWN*RETt+b7OWN*Dt*RETt 
+b8Wedge+b9Wedge*Dt+b10Wedge*RETt+b11Wedge*Dt*RETt 
+b12Dispersion+b13Dispersion*Dt+b14Dispersion*RETt+b15Dispersion*Dt*RETt 
+b16MBRt+b17MBRt*Dt+b18MBRt*RETt+b19MBRt*Dt*RETt 
+b20LEVt+b21LEVt*Dt+b22LEVt*RETt+b23LEVt*Dt*RETt 
+b24SIZEt+b25SIZEt*Dt+b26SIZEt*RETt+b27SIZEt*Dt*RETt  
+b24LITt+b25LITt*Dt+b26LITt*RETt+b27LITt*Dt*RETt 
+Country, Industry and Year Fixed Effects+ξ                     (1)                                               
 
where NI is net income before extraordinary items (IC data 32), deﬂated by beginning of 
period prices (MVEt-1). D is an indicator variable equals one if RET is less than zero, and 
zero otherwise. RET is holding period stock return, including dividends, over the ﬁrm’s 
ﬁscal accounting year. I also control three firm-level control variables: firm size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MBR), and litigation risk (LIT). The measurement of 
the variables is detailed in Appendix 2-A. 
To test H2a and H2b, I regress the equation (1) in two subsamples with different legal 
institution quality (strong and weak) and compare their coefficient differences. Hypothesis 
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1 predicts b11 to be positive or b10 to be negative. Hypothesis 2 predicts b15 to be positive or 
b14 to be negative. Hypothesis 3 predicts b10, b11, b14 and b15 to be more pronounced in 
stronger legal institutions. 
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2.4 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
1.4.1 Sample Selection 
 
My sample consists of listed companies from 13 countries in Western Europe: 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The ownership data are from Faccio and 
Lang (2002). Ownership for each firm is computed at some point during the period 
1996-1999. As we known, ownership structure changes very slowly over time (Faccio 
and Lang 2002, La Porta, et al. 1999). The sample period spans from 1995 to 2004, 
which is close to the time the ownership data is collected.  
To ensure the accuracy of the matching data, I match the ownership data of 
Faccio and Lang (2002) with three different popular databases containing financial 
data of publicly listed firms: Global Vantage Industrial/ Commercial (IC), Worldscope, 
and Burea van Dijk (BvD) ORBI. Stock price data is drawn from the Datastream, 
Global Vantage Issues ﬁles, and Burea van Dijk (BvD) ORBIS. Then I cross check the 
matching financial and stock price data from these databases. If there are any data 
inconsistencies among these databases, I check the officially published financial 
reports to decide which one to be used. Therefore, for a company in the ownership 
data of Faccio and Lang (2002), its financial and stock price data might come from 
any one of the three databases.  
I exclude ﬁrm-year observations with missing values to compute dependent and 
independent variables. Next I delete observations for financial institutions (SIC 
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6000-6999). I also eliminate observations with negative dispersion of cash-flow rights. 
To mitigate the influence of potential outliers, I winsorize each variable (NI, RET, 
MBR, LEV, SIZE) at the 1st and 99th percentile values. The final sample consists of 
13,544 observations from 13 western European countries. Table 1 describes the 
sample selection procedure in details. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics by country, provides the 
correlation matrix among the variables used in the regressions, and reports the 
distribution of firms by country and ownership structure type. Panel A reports the 
mean values of each variable for each country sample and for the total sample. The 
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum value and maximum value of each 
variable are also reported for the total sample. As shown in the second column, the 
size of the country samples ranges from 208 firm-years (38 firms) for Ireland to 5,429 
firm-years (919 firms) for the United Kingdom. Accounting earnings (NI) have 
positive mean values except for that of Norway (-0.2%). Consistent with the findings 
of prior studies, accounting earnings are negatively skewed and stock returns are 
positively skewed. Moreover, stock returns display greater volatility than accounting 
income, indicating that managers tend to smooth earnings. Corporate ownership 
structure shows considerable variations across countries. France has the highest 
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average level of cash-flow rights of the largest controlling owner (OWN=0.471), and 
Ireland has the lowest (OWN=0.189). Switzerland has the highest average level of 
wedge (Wedge=0.117), and Portugal has the lowest (Wedge=0.008). Moreover, the 
average level of dispersion of cash flow rights is highest in Italy (Dispersion=0.080) 
and lowest in Belgium (Dispersion=0.021). Leverage (LEV) and market-to-book ratio 
(MBR) also vary significantly across countries. The standard deviation of LEV (MBR) 
is 1.695 times (1.434 times) greater than the mean value for the total sample. Firm 
size shows relatively lower variation compared with other variables. 
 [Insert Table 2 around here] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the correlation matrix among the regression variables. 
Consistent with prior literature, accounting earnings (NI) are positively correlated to 
stock returns (RET). Wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights (OWN) is 
positively related to accounting earnings (NI), suggesting that firms with higher 
wedge are likely to report higher earnings. The largest controlling owner’s cash-flow 
rights (OWN) is positively associated with dispersion of cash-flow rights (Dispersion) 
and negatively associated with wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights 
(Wedge). The Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient between OWN and Wedge 
is only -0.139 (-0.172), suggesting that Wedge is not simply a proxy for cash-flow 
rights. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient between Wedge and Dispersion 
is only -0.059 (0.008), suggesting that wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights are 
different dimensions of ultimate ownership. In addition, firm size (SIZE) is negatively 
associated with the largest controlling owner’s cash-flow rights (OWN) and positively 
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associated with wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights (Wedge), 
indicating that controlling owner of large firms are more likely to build wedge 
between control rights and cash-flow rights and less likely to own high percent of 
cash-flow rights. Moreover, firm size (SIZE) is negatively associated with dispersion 
of cash-flow rights (Dispersion). However, these results should be interpreted with 
cautions, as the pairwise correlations may suffer from correlated omitted variables, 
which are controlled for in the regression analyses. 
Panel C of Table 2 reports the number of firms for each ownership type by 
country. In 10 out of 13 countries (except Finland, Norway, and Sweden), most of the 
firms are controlled by one large shareholder. In all the 13 countries, the number of 
firms with no controlling owner is less than that of firms with one or multiple 
controlling owners. In the full sample, there are 34.78 percent of firms with multiple 
controlling shareholders, indicating the popularity of such kind of firms. In Finland, 
more than half of the firms are controlled by multiple shareholders. While in Austria, 
only 20 percent of firms are controlled by more than one shareholder. In sum, the data 
reported in Panel C indicates that a great number of firms are controlled by multiple 
large shareholders. 
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2.5 Empirical Results 
 
My multivariate tests are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). In all the 
regressions, I report robust t-statistics after correcting for firm clustered standards 
errors that are likely to be present in the panel data (Petersen 2009). 
 
2.5.1 Regression results the association between ownership structure and 
accounting conservatism  
 
 Table 3 presents the regression coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics 
from estimating equation (1) in full sample and the sample of firms with multiple 
controlling owners.  
As shown in Table 3, the coefficients on D*RET (b3) are significant in both 
regressions, indicating the existence of accounting conservatism in both samples. In 
both regressions, the coefficients on Wedge*RET (b10) are significantly negative, 
while those on Wedge*D*RET (b11) are insignificant (one positive while the other 
negative). This indicates that, firms with higher wedge show lower timeliness of good 
news recognition, consistent with the explanation that outsiders worry about insiders 
favorably biasing the accounting numbers and demand lower timeliness of good news 
recognition. However, I find no evidence that firms with higher wedge have 
significantly higher incremental timeliness of bad news recognition. In sum, the result 
indicates that wedge is positively associated with accounting conservatism (lower 
timeliness of good news recognition holding incremental timeliness of bad news 
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recognition constant), supporting my first hypothesis H1a. 
 In both regressions, the coefficients on Dispersion*RET (b14) are significantly 
negative, and those on Dispersion*D*RET (b15) are significantly positive. In 
regression (1) (regression (2)), the coefficient on Dispersion*RET (b14) is -0.097 
(-0.071), while the coefficient on RET (b2) is 0.035 (0.023). This means that a 1% 
increase of dispersion of cash flow rights could lead to about 2.77% (3.24%) decrease 
of timeliness of good news recognition in regression (1) (regression (2)). Therefore, 
the association between dispersion of cash flow rights and timeliness of good news 
recognition is not only statistically but also economically significant. This is 
consistent with the explanation that outsiders concern with the insiders’ behavior of 
favorably biasing the accounting numbers and hence demand insiders to recognize 
good news less timely. In regression (1) (regression (2)), the coefficient on 
Dispersion*D*RET (b15) is 0.298 (0.520), while the coefficient on D*RET (b3) is 
0.482 (0.610). This means that a 1% increase of dispersion of cash flow rights could 
lead to about 0.62% (0.85%) decrease of incremental timeliness of bad news 
recognition in regression one (two). Therefore, the association between dispersion of 
cash flow rights and incremental timeliness of bad news recognition is not only 
statistically but also economically significant. This finding is consistent with firms 
with more agency problem demand higher incremental timeliness of bad news 
recognition. Overall, the empirical results suggest that dispersion of cash-flow rights 
is positively associated with accounting conservatism, consistent with my second 
hypothesis H1b. 
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Moreover, the coefficients on OWN*RET (b6) are significantly positive in 
regression (1), and those on OWN*D*RET (b7) are significantly negative in both 
regressions. This indicates that, firms with higher cash-flow rights recognize good 
news more timely and have lower incremental timeliness of bad news recognition, 
consistent with the alignment effects of cash-flow rights documented by prior studies 
(Claessens, et al. 2002). The coefficients on the control variables are generally 
consistent with extant literature. Both market-to-book (MBR) ratio and firm size (SIZE) 
are negatively associated with accounting conservatism, and leverage (LEV) is 
positively associated with accounting conservatism. However, the effects of litigation 
risk on accounting conservatism are mixed and insignificant, probably because its 
effects are subsumed by other factors or the measurement of litigation risk is noisy in 
an international setting.  
In sum, the empirical results in Table 3 provide evidences consistent with my 
first two hypotheses (H1a and H1b) and imply that both wedge and dispersion of 
cash-flow rights are positively associated with the use of accounting conservatism. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
2.5.2 Regression results on the effects of legal institutions 
 
Table 4 provides the empirical analysis for H2a and H2b. I regress equation (1) 
in the subsamples of strong and weak legal institutions. Column (1) reports results of 
regressing equation (1) in subsample of strong legal institutions, while column (2) 
98 
 
reports those in subsample of weak legal institutions. Column (3) reports the 
t-statistics of the coefficient difference between regression (1) and (2). Panel A 
presents the by-group regression results setting legal institutions to shareholder rights, 
Panel B presents results setting legal institutions to investor protection, and Panel C 
presents results setting legal institutions to judiciary efficiency. 
As we can see from Table 4, the coefficients on D*RET (b3) are more 
pronounced in strong legal institutions. The coefficient differences of b3 between 
strong and weak legal institutions are significantly positive in all the three panels, 
consistent with Bushman and Piotroski (2006). In all the three regressions, the 
coefficients on Wedge* RET (b10) are significantly negative in the sample of strong 
legal institutions and insignificantly negative in the sample of weak legal institutions. 
This means the negative associations between wedge and the timeliness of good news 
recognition documented in 5.1 only exist in strong legal institutions, indicating that 
legal institutions strengthen the positive association between wedge and accounting 
conservatism. Although the coefficients on Wedge*D*RET (b11) are insignificant in all 
the six regressions, in two out of three Panels (except Panel B), the coefficient 
differences of Wedge*D*RET (b11) are significantly positive, indicating that b11 is 
more pronounced in strong legal institutions, consistent with the view that the positive 
association between wedge and accounting conservatism is more pronounced in 
stronger legal institutions. Overall, the regression results suggest that legal institutions 
strengthen the positive association between wedge and accounting conservatism, 
consistent with H2a. 
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The coefficients on Dispersion* RET (b14) are significantly negative in two out 
of three regressions in the strong-legal sample and insignificantly negative in all the 
regressions of the weak-legal sample. This means the negative associations between 
dispersion and the timeliness and good news recognition documented in 5.1 generally 
exist in strong legal institutions. The coefficients on Dispersion* D*RET (b15) are 
significantly positive in all the regressions of strong-legal sample and insignificantly 
in all the regressions of the weak-legal sample. This indicates that the positive 
associations between dispersion and the incremental timeliness and bad news 
recognition documented in 5.1 generally exist in strong legal institutions. Moreover, 
in all the three Panels, the coefficient differences of Dispersion*D*RET (b15) are 
significantly positive, indicating that b15 is more pronounced in strong legal 
institutions. In sum, the regression results suggest that legal institutions strengthen the 
positive association between dispersion and accounting conservatism, consistent with 
H2b. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
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2.6 Robustness Checks 
 
2.6.1 Reestimation using Ball & Shivakumar (2006) Model  
 
An important concern is that the Basu’s (1997) Model applied in the empirical tests 
may be greatly affected by the different extent of market efficiency in different countries. 
To assuage this concern, I borrow the model from Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) to 
examine the asymmetric timeliness of earnings without reference to security prices. 
Speciﬁcally, I present estimations of the following model: 
ACCRUALS=c0+c1*N+c2CFO+c3N*CFO 
+c4OWN+c5OWN*N+c6OWN*CFO+c7OWN*N*CFO 
+c8Wedge+c9Wedge*N+c10Wedge*CFO+c11Wedge*N*CFO 
+c12Dispersion+c13Dispersion*N+c14Dispersion*CFO+c15Dispersion*N*CFO 
+ c16FASSET+c17FASSET*N+c18FASSET*CFO+c19FASSET*N*CFO 
+ c20ΔSALESt+c21ΔSALESt*N+c22ΔSALESt*CFOt+c23ΔSALESt*N*CFOt 
+ Country, Industry, and Year Fixed Effects+ξ                             (2)                                                           
where ACCRUALS is current period accruals, CFO is current period operating cash 
flows, and N is an indicator variable equals one if CFO is negative, zero otherwise. 
Since Hribar and Collins (2002) argue that current (working capital) accruals are 
biased when estimated from changes in balance sheet data, I use the CFO data 
directly from cash flow statement in this paper.  
In Panel A, the coefficients on Wedge*N*CFO and Dispersion*N*CFO are 
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significantly positive, supporting the hypothesis that wedge and dispersion of 
cash-flow rights are positively associated with accounting conservatism. Panel B, C 
and D report that the positive coefficients on Wedge*N*CFO and Dispersion*N*CFO 
only exist in strong legal institutions, consistent with the view that legal institutions 
strengthen the positive association between wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights and 
accounting conservatism. Overall, the results reported in Table 5 are similar to those 
in Table 3, and Table 4, further strengthen the validity of my conclusions.  
 [Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
2.6.2 Reestimation using three-year Basu (1997) specification 
 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) argue that the beginning composition of equity 
value affects asymmetric timeliness measured over short horizons. Specifically, past 
timeliness of earnings with respect to returns influences future earnings timeliness 
over short periods, which might affect the results of Basu’s (1997) model. To mitigate 
the concern that one-year Baus’s (1997) model might lead to biased results, I 
reexamine my research questions using earnings and return over longer periods, 
speciﬁcally, over the following three years. 
NIt-3,t=d0+d1Dt-3,t+d2RETt-3,t+d3Dt-3,t*RETt-3,t 
+d4OWN+d5OWN*Dt-3,t+d6OWN*RETt-3,t+d7OWN*Dt-3,t*RETt-3,t 
+d4Wedge+d5Wedge*Dt-3,t+d6Wedge*RETt-3,t+d7Wedge*Dt-3,t*RETt-3,t 
+d4Dispersion+d5Dispersion*Dt-3,t+d6Dispersion*RETt-3,t 
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+d7Dispersion*Dt-3,t*RETt-3,t+Control Variables  
+Country, Industry, and Year Fixed Effects+ξ                   (4)                                                                                                                                                         
where NI is equal to the sum of net income before extraordinary items over the 
estimation period divided by beginning of estimation period market value of equity. 
RET is equal to the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return over the estimation period. 
Dt-3,t is equal to one if RETt-3,t is negative, zero otherwise. Dt-3,t is equal to one if 
RETt-3,t is negative, zero otherwise. 
As we can see from Table 6, the coefficients on Wedge*D*RET and 
Dispersion*D*RET are all significantly positive, consistent with H1a and H1b. 
Moreover, in Panel B, C, and D, we can see that the positive association between 
wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights and accounting conservatism generally exist in 
strong legal institutions, consistent with H2a and H2b. In sum, the results reported in 
Table 6 are similar to my main results.  
 [Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
2.6.3 Using firm-level accounting conservatism measure 
 
Basu’s (1997) return model has several economic and econometric problems 
(Dietrich, et al. 2007, Givoly, et al. 2007). To assuage the concern that my estimation 
on accounting conservatism is noisy, I use the methodology proposed by Khan and 
Watts (2007) to calculate firm-level accounting conservatism measure – C_score. 
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Then I reexamine all the research questions using C_score as the dependent variable, 
and the empirical results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 
2.6.4 Other robustness checks 
 
I also conduct a number of other robustness checks. Firstly, I construct several 
different measures of ownership structures. I use divergence rather than wedge to 
proxy the detachment of control rights from cash-flow rights. Specifically, divergence 
is defined as 1 minus the cash flow rights divided by the voting rights, consistent with 
Haw et al. (2004) and Fan and Wong (2002). Moreover, I use two different measures 
to proxy dispersion of cash flow rights. The first one is calculated as one minus the 
second largest shareholder’s cash-flow rights divided by the largest shareholder’s 
cash-flow rights. The second one is computed as the cash-flow-right difference of the 
two largest shareholders divided by the sum of the cash-flow rights of them. The 
results using the alternative ownership structure measurements (untabulated) are 
similar to those reported in Table 3 and Table 4. Secondly, to accommodate the 
potential nonlinear relation, I transform OWN, Wedge, and Dispersion into a 
fractional rank variables, and reestimate all the regressions. The results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. Third, as the sample size varies across countries, I apply 
weighted least squares (WLS) procedures, placing an equal weight on each country 
sample. The untabulated results are similar to those reported in Table 3, and Table 4. 
In sum, the sensitivity tests reveal that my results appear robust. Fourth, I test for the 
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possible endogenous selection of wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights. To control 
for possible endogenous effects, I use a two-stage model in which wedge and 
dispersion of cash-flow rights is replaced with a predicted value. I estimate a 
first-stage model of wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights as a function of firm 
size, prior period performance, growth, leverage, and R&D investment. The results of 
the two-stage framework are consistent with my main results. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I examine the association between ownership structure and 
accounting conservatism as well as how legal institutions influence this association. 
Using a comprehensive, firm-level ownership dataset for thirteen Western European 
countries to conduct the empirical analysis, I have the following empirical findings. 
First, both wedge and dispersion of cash-flow rights are positively associated with 
accounting conservatism. Second, legal institutions strengthen the positive association 
between wedge/dispersion of cash-flow rights and accounting conservatism. 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it adds to the 
growing body of literature on the role of accounting conservatism in mitigating agency 
problems. The existing literature document that accounting conservatism helps mitigate 
the manager-shareholder and debtholder-shareholder conflicts, while this study stresses 
the role of accounting conservatism in assuaging another kind of agency problem: interest 
conflicts between majority shareholders and outsiders (both minority shareholders and 
debtholders).  
Secondly, this study highlights the importance of the second largest controlling 
shareholder in affecting the level of accounting conservatism. Previous studies on 
accounting consequence of ultimate ownership generally neglect the influences from 
controlling shareholders other than the largest shareholder. Prior finance and economics 
literature reveals that multiple large owners could either cross-monitor or build coalition 
and affect the firm’s agency costs and valuation, suggesting that it is important to take 
into account the effects of multiple large shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000, 
106 
 
Bloch and Hege 2001, Laeven and Levine 2008, Pagano and Roell 1998). To my 
knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the effects of multiple large shareholders 
on accounting conservatism.  
Thirdly, this essay reinforces the important role played by legal institutions in 
influencing the installation of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms. The findings 
of this paper are consistent with the argument that legal institutions are important in 
determining the costs and benefits of launching firm-level governance mechanisms. 
Finally, the findings of this study have important implications for accounting 
standard setters attempting to eliminate conservatism in financial reports. My finding that 
accounting conservatism increases in response to increases in interest conflicts between 
minority shareholders and insiders implies that accounting conservatism is a useful tool to 
assuage agency problems. This finding reminds standard setters to take caution when they 
attempt to eliminate accounting conservatism. 
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Appendix 2-A Variable Definitions 
 
Variable                          Definition                                                                
Country Variables 
SRIGHTS    This index of Shareholder rights is formed by adding one when: (1) the 
country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders 
are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General 
Shareholders= Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (4) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
Extraordinary Shareholders= Meeting is less than or equal to ten 
percent (the sample median); or (6) when shareholders have 
preemptive rights that can only be waved by a shareholders meeting. 
The range for the index is from zero to six. Source: La Porta et al. 
(1998). 
JUDEFF     Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as 
it affects business, particularly foreign firms produced by the country 
risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). It may be taken to 
represent investors’ assessment of conditions in the country in question. 
Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores representing lower efficiency 
levels. Source: International Country Risk Guide. 
INVPROt  Index of investor protection, constructed as the principal component of 
disclosure, liability standards, and anti-director rights. Scale is from 0 
to 10. This data is available from La Porta et al. (2006). 
Firm Variables 
RET  Holding period stock return, including dividends, over the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal 
accounting year. This data is drawn from Datastream, Standard and 
Poor’s Global Vantage Issues ﬁles, or Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS. 
MVE  Market value of equity at the end of a given ﬁscal year, deﬁned as 
number of shares outstanding times closing price available for the last 
month of the ﬁscal year. This data is gathered from Datastream, 
Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage Issues ﬁles, or Bureau van Dijk 
(Bvd) ORBIS. 
NI  Net income before extraordinary items (IC data 32), deﬂated by 
beginning of period prices (MVEt-1). This data is drawn from 
Worldscope, Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage Industrial 
/Commercial ﬁles, or Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS. 
D  An indicator variable equals one if RET is less than zero; zero 
otherwise. 
OWN        The cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder that has control of ten 
percent or more of the voting rights. It equals zero if the corporation is 
widely held. This data is collected from (Faccio and Lang 2002). 
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Wedge      Wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights equals the control 
rights of the largest shareholder minus the cash-flow rights of the 
largest shareholder. This data is collected from (Faccio and Lang 
2002). 
Dispersion    Dispersion of cash-flow rights equals the difference between the 
cash-flow rights of the two largest shareholders. This variable equals 
zero when the firm does not have two shareholders with at least ten 
percent of the voting rights. The cash-flow rights of the second largest 
shareholder equal cash-flow rights of the second largest shareholder 
that has the control of ten percentage or more of the voting rights and 
zero if  the corporation if widely held, or if there is only one 
shareholder with control of ten percent or more of the voting rights. 
This data is collected from (Faccio and Lang 2002). 
CFO  Operating cash ﬂow, deﬂated by beginning of period prices (MVEt-1). 
This data is drawn from Worldscope, Standard and Poor’s Global 
Vantage Industrial /Commercial ﬁles, or Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) 
ORBIS. 
ACCRUALS  Total accruals, deﬂated by the average total assets, deﬁned as Net 
income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating 
activities, scaled by the average total assets. This data is drawn from 
Worldscope, Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage Industrial 
/Commercial ﬁles, or Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS. 
N  An indicator variable equals one if CFOt is less than zero; zero 
otherwise. 
LEV  Leverage is the total debt deflated by the market capitalization. This 
data is drawn from Worldscope, Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage 
Industrial /Commercial ﬁles, or Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS. 
SIZE  Firm size is the natural logarithm of the total assets (in millions of U.S. 
dollars) at the end of fiscal year t. This data is drawn from Worldscope, 
Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage Industrial /Commercial ﬁles, or 
Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS. 
MBR    Market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity. This data is drawn from Worldscope, Standard and 
Poor’s Global Vantage Industrial /Commercial ﬁles, or Bureau van 
Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS. 
LIT         LIT is coded one if a ﬁrm is in a litigious industry - SIC codes 
2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370 - and zero 
otherwise. This data is drawn from Worldscope, Standard and Poor’s 
Global Vantage Industrial /Commercial ﬁles, or Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) 
ORBIS. 
FASSET     Book value of fixed assets scaled by the average total assets. This data 
is drawn from Worldscope, Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage 
Industrial /Commercial ﬁles, or Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS. 
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ΔSALES       Change in sales scaled by the average total assets. This data is drawn 
from Worldscope, Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage Industrial 
/Commercial ﬁles, or Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 1 Sample Selection 
 
Sample-Selection Process Obs. Removed 
Obs. 
Remaining 
Initial sample from 1995 to 2003 available from 
Datastream/Worldscope, Compustat Global Vantage, or 
Bureau van Dijk (Bvd) ORBIS for the 13 Western 
European economies
 
 
 
After eliminating firms with missing values of 
dependent and independent variables 
 
After eliminating financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999)  
 
Final sample that merges the data on the two largest 
controlling owners’ voting and cash flow rights and the 
financial data obtained in the previous step 
 
After eliminating firms with negative dispersion of 
cash-flow rights
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (37,575) 
 
 (291) 
 
 
 
(89,40) 
 
 
(512) 
 
 
 
60,862 
 
 
23,287 
 
22,996 
 
 
 
14,056 
 
 
13,544 
 
Notes: This table presents the sample selection process and data requirements for the regressions. The 
final sample for these regressions consists of listed companies from 13 Western European economies 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). 
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Table 2 Summary statistics and correlations 
 
Panel A: Country-level descriptive statistics    
Country Obs No. of firms NI RET OWN Wedge Dispersion MBR LEV SIZE LIT 
Austria 400 61 0.039  -0.016  0.463  0.056  0.040  1.564  1.078  12.629  0.063  
Belgium 332 48 0.048  -0.041  0.321  0.038  0.021  1.836  0.758  13.024  0.145  
Finland 445 85 0.061  0.014  0.295  0.032  0.070  2.062  0.687  12.185  0.090  
France 1942 314 0.014  -0.034  0.471  0.007  0.074  1.826  0.887  12.629  0.149  
Germany 2264 343 0.019  -0.012  0.455  0.043  0.070  2.704  0.802  12.566  0.117  
Ireland 208 38 0.017  0.497  0.189  0.018  0.057  2.762  0.526  12.254  0.135  
Italy 428 67 0.024  0.140  0.417  0.088  0.080  2.164  0.846  13.178  0.124  
Norway 379 82 -0.002  0.159  0.261  0.053  0.054  1.806  1.300  12.427  0.106  
Portugal 180 40 0.024  0.013  0.408  0.008  0.061  2.104  1.150  12.002  0.022  
Spain 581 91 0.066  0.062  0.299  0.019  0.074  2.068  0.589  13.133  0.062  
Sweden 479 103 0.035  0.122  0.231  0.053  0.054  2.185  0.766  12.833  0.109  
Switzerland 477 73 0.041  0.472  0.291  0.117  0.039  2.155  0.844  12.711  0.184  
UK 5429 919 0.016  0.073  0.197  0.018  0.048  2.605  0.455  11.808  0.153  
 13544 2264          
Mean   0.023  0.062  0.314  0.031  0.058  2.348  0.685  12.314  0.133  
Median   0.060  0.000  0.250  0.000  0.000  1.521  0.304  12.145  0.000  
Std.   0.213  0.596  0.256  0.075  0.127  3.368  1.161  1.842  0.340  
Min   -1.227  -0.993  0.000  -0.209  0.000  -6.358  0.000  8.519  0.000  
Max   0.506  3.279  1.000  0.685  0.805  23.101  7.645  17.349  1.000  
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Panel B: Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman rank (below the diagonal) correlations 
Variable NI RET Own Wedge Dispersion MBR LEV SIZE LIT 
NI 1 0.170 -0.002 0.026 -0.005 0.022 -0.324 0.126 -0.007 
  (<0.001) (0.837) (0.002) (0.560) (0.009) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.398) 
RET 0.314 1 -0.042 0.083 -0.016 0.168 -0.131 0.034 0.040 
 (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.059) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Own -0.032 -0.038 1 -0.139 0.287 -0.006 0.060 -0.074 0.002 
 (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.514) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.796) 
Wedge 0.027 0.045 -0.172 1 -0.059 -0.017 0.032 0.088 0.018 
 (0.002) (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (0.042) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.034) 
Dispersion -0.009 -0.009 0.160 0.008 1 0.002 0.019 -0.034 -0.012 
 (0.287) (0.318) (<0.001) (0.335)  (0.807) (0.290) (<0.001) (0.165) 
MBR -0.025 0.227 -0.049 -0.035 -0.021 1 -0.186 -0.002 0.037 
 (0.004) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.013)  (<0.001) (0.811) (<0.001) 
LEV -0.102 -0.187 0.058 0.071 0.018 -0.438 1 0.081 -0.054 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.038) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
SIZE 0.101 0.059 -0.075 0.134 -0.054 0.085 0.215 1 -0.008 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.365) 
LIT -0.038 0.018 0.003 0.010 -0.028 0.062 -0.082 -0.013 1 
 (<0.001) (0.038) (0.763) (0.252) (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.124)  
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Panel C: Number of firms by country and ownership type 
Country Firms with no controlling owner Firms with one controlling owner Firms with multiple controlling owners Total 
Austria 16 (4.00%) 303 (75.75%) 81 (20.25%) 400 
Belgium 18 (5.42%) 241 (72.59%) 73 (21.99%) 332 
Finland 60 (13.48%) 156 (35.06%) 229 (51.46%) 445 
France 98 (5.05%) 1222 (62.92%) 622 (32.03%) 1942 
Germany 110 (4.86%) 1339 (59.14%) 815 (36.00%) 2264 
Ireland 57 (27.40%) 88 (42.31%) 63 (30.29%) 208 
Italy 1 (0.23%) 275 (64.25%) 152 (35.51%) 428 
Norway 24 (6.33%) 167 (44.06%) 188 (49.60%) 379 
Portugal 1 (0.56%) 119 (66.11%) 60 (33.33%) 180 
Spain 48 (8.26%) 299 (51.46%) 234 (40.28%) 581 
Sweden 26 (5.43%) 220 (45.93%) 233 (48.64%) 479 
Switzerland 38 (7.97%) 320 (67.09%) 119 (24.95%) 477 
UK 1176 (21.66%) 2412 (44.43%) 1841 (33.91%) 5429 
Total 1673 (12.35%) 7161 (52.87%) 4710 (34.78%) 13544 
This table reports summary statistics and correlations for the sample. Panel A of this table presents the country-level summary statistics for the research variables. The mean 
values of each variable are calculated and reported for each sample country. The last five rows report the cross-country mean, median, standard deviation, minimum value 
and maximum value. Panel B of this table presents correlation matrix of firm-level variables for 13,544 observations over the 1995-2003 period. P-values (in parenthetic) are 
two-sided. See Appendix 2-A for variable definitions. Panel C of this table reports the number of firms (with percentage of country-totals between brackets) for each 
ownership type by country.
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Table 3 Ownership structures and accounting conservatism 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Multiple Blockholders 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
RET + 0.035 1.161 0.023 0.461 
D*RET + 0.482 5.890*** 0.610 3.641*** 
OWN*RET + 0.033 1.751* -0.006 -0.062 
OWN*D*RET - -0.214 -4.593*** -0.415 -1.850* 
Wedge*RET - -0.092 -2.527** -0.164 -2.126** 
Wedge*D*RET + -0.121 -0.899 0.206 0.675 
Dispersion*RET - -0.097 -2.097** -0.071 -1.739* 
Dispersion*D*RET + 0.298 2.998*** 0.520 2.368** 
MBR*RET + -0.001 -1.947* -0.000 -0.0559 
MBR*D*RET - -0.006 -1.319 -0.009 -1.165 
LEV*RET - -0.013 -1.437 -0.013 -0.701 
LEV*D*RET + 0.073 4.029*** 0.087 3.006*** 
SIZE*RET + -0.001 -0.305 0.000 0.0822 
SIZE*D*RET - -0.029 -4.908*** -0.038 -3.229*** 
LIT*RET - -0.003 -0.276 0.020 0.921 
LIT*D*RET + 0.015 0.468 -0.032 -0.571 
D  -0.039 -1.143 -0.035 -0.528 
OWN  -0.014 -1.213 0.037 0.662 
OWN*D  -0.008 -0.424 -0.013 -0.159 
Wedge  0.039 1.499 0.066 1.313 
Wedge*D  -0.028 -0.607 -0.007 -0.0839 
Dispersion  0.032 1.319 -0.026 -0.439 
Dispersion*D  0.041 1.106 0.069 0.789 
MBR  -0.003 -2.641*** -0.003 -2.086** 
MBR*D  -0.001 -0.649 -0.003 -0.762 
LEV  -0.034 -4.382*** -0.045 -3.253*** 
LEV*D  -0.009 -0.822 0.004 0.228 
SIZE  0.010 6.126*** 0.008 2.889*** 
SIZE*D  0.002 0.977 0.001 0.294 
LIT  -0.032 -2.216** -0.021 -0.927 
LIT*D  0.009 0.723 -0.004 -0.165 
Constant  0.009 0.370 0.026 0.551 
Observations  13544 13544 4712 4712 
Adj. R-squared  0.218 0.218 0.242 0.242 
This table presents the regression coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics from estimating 
equation (1). Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix 2-A. Regression (1) includes all the 
observations in the full sample, while regression (2) only includes firms with multiple controlling 
owners. This table presents robust (clustered) t-statistics (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 4 Effects of legal institutions on the association between ownership 
structures and accounting conservatism 
Panel A: Legal institution=Shareholder rights 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Strong  
Shareholder Rights 
(2) 
Weak  
Shareholder Rights 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics t-statistics 
RET + 0.035 0.941 0.040 0.694 0.160 
2.411** 
-2.565** 
-0.730 
0.210 
1.662* 
-0.523 
1.720* 
-0.714 
-0.445 
0.654 
-1.450 
-0.113 
-1.495 
1.261 
0.159 
0.441 
1.671* 
-1.902* 
0.244 
-1.594 
-0.664 
1.345 
2.496** 
-1.159 
-0.846 
-0.849 
-0.570 
0.279 
-1.004 
0.441 
D*RET + 0.583 4.596*** 0.206 1.823* 
OWN*RET + -0.014 -0.561 0.078 2.758*** 
OWN*D*RET - -0.198 -2.472** -0.097 -1.609 
Wedge*RET - -0.089 -2.049** -0.111 -1.592 
Wedge*D*RET + 0.298 1.366 -0.196 -1.207 
Dispersion*RET - -0.098 -1.582 -0.048 -0.820 
Dispersion*D*RET + 0.459 2.487** 0.145 1.335 
MBR*RET + -0.001 -1.602 -0.000 -0.178 
MBR*D*RET - -0.008 -1.120 -0.004 -0.655 
LEV*RET - -0.009 -0.890 -0.021 -0.904 
LEV*D*RET + 0.047 1.902* 0.096 3.017*** 
SIZE*RET + -0.000 -0.159 -0.001 -0.321 
SIZE*D*RET - -0.034 -3.429*** -0.015 -1.979** 
LIT*RET - 0.004 0.348 -0.022 -1.092 
LIT*D*RET + 0.026 0.585 0.012 0.266 
D  -0.030 -0.638 -0.037 -0.684 
OWN  0.019 1.132 -0.014 -0.840 
OWN*D  -0.045 -1.568 0.023 0.891 
Wedge  0.053 1.504 0.036 0.838 
Wedge*D  -0.093 -1.410 0.073 1.066 
Dispersion  -0.002 -0.0696 0.028 0.905 
Dispersion*D  0.106 1.824* 0.016 0.344 
MBR  -0.001 -0.785 -0.007 -3.914*** 
MBR*D  -0.003 -1.018 0.002 0.740 
LEV  -0.039 -3.357*** -0.029 -2.657*** 
LEV*D  -0.020 -1.262 -0.002 -0.107 
SIZE  0.008 3.993*** 0.013 5.040*** 
SIZE*D  0.003 0.936 0.000 0.0153 
LIT  -0.050 -2.827*** -0.011 -0.456 
LIT*D  0.015 0.912 0.001 0.0606 
Constant  0.031 1.035 -0.096 -2.612*** 
Observations  7941 7941 5603 5603 
Adj. R-squared  0.243 0.243 0.229 0.229 
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Panel B: Legal institution=Investor Protection 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Strong  
Investor Protection 
(2) 
Weak  
Investor Protection 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics t-statistics 
RET + 0.094 2.165** -0.058 -1.305 2.921*** 
0.489 
-1.904* 
-1.813* 
-1.498 
-0.292 
-1.120 
2.223** 
-0.840 
-1.524 
-0.557 
0.578 
-2.548** 
-0.120 
0.687 
-0.484 
1.468 
3.389*** 
-2.444** 
2.064** 
-1.366 
-0.111 
-0.448 
2.206** 
-1.344 
-0.264 
-0.865 
2.829*** 
-0.590 
-0.00558 
-0.802 
D*RET + 0.474 4.369*** 0.318 2.474** 
OWN*RET + -0.002 -0.0789 0.064 2.248** 
OWN*D*RET - -0.198 -2.947*** -0.105 -1.493 
Wedge*RET - -0.180 -2.086** -0.038 -0.933 
Wedge*D*RET + -0.069 -0.202 0.056 0.390 
Dispersion*RET - -0.122 -1.801* -0.012 -0.229 
Dispersion*D*RET + 0.339 2.490** 0.050 0.151 
MBR*RET + -0.002 -2.345** -0.001 -0.384 
MBR*D*RET - -0.013 -1.927* -0.000 -0.0361 
LEV*RET - -0.021 -1.172 -0.010 -1.350 
LEV*D*RET + 0.084 3.243*** 0.064 2.393** 
SIZE*RET + -0.004 -1.370 0.005 1.613 
SIZE*D*RET - -0.028 -3.333*** -0.022 -2.583*** 
LIT*RET - 0.002 0.0865 -0.011 -0.822 
LIT*D*RET + 0.010 0.201 0.039 1.008 
D  -0.007 -0.148 -0.114 -2.100** 
OWN  0.032 1.925* -0.041 -2.148** 
OWN*D  -0.043 -1.740* 0.050 1.692* 
Wedge  0.131 2.136** -0.014 -0.451 
Wedge*D  -0.108 -1.015 0.072 1.367 
Dispersion  0.012 0.365 0.011 0.315 
Dispersion*D  0.030 0.597 0.068 1.395 
MBR  -0.001 -1.030 -0.007 -3.664*** 
MBR*D  -0.004 -1.288 0.002 0.683 
LEV  -0.035 -3.258*** -0.026 -2.594*** 
LEV*D  -0.018 -1.267 -0.002 -0.136 
SIZE  0.012 5.951*** 0.005 1.914* 
SIZE*D  0.002 0.470 0.005 1.234 
LIT  -0.057 -2.829*** -0.010 -0.417 
LIT*D  0.006 0.324 0.026 1.355 
Constant  -0.081 -2.772*** 0.070 1.794* 
Observations  9164 9164 4380 4380 
Adj. R-squared  0.244 0.244 0.227 0.227 
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Panel C: Legal institution=Judiciary Efficiency 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Strong  
Judiciary Efficiency 
(2) 
Weak  
Judiciary Efficiency 
(3) 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics t-statistics 
RET + 0.080 1.949* -0.039 -0.723 2.349** 
1.669* 
-1.696* 
-2.324** 
-0.651 
2.158** 
-0.707 
1.871* 
-0.374 
-1.716* 
-0.352 
0.382 
-2.117** 
-0.940 
0.108 
-0.344 
1.752* 
3.066*** 
-2.583*** 
1.224 
-1.270 
-0.102 
-0.139 
1.983** 
-1.239 
-0.578 
-0.742 
2.911*** 
-0.902 
-0.0340 
-1.103 
2.376** 
 
D*RET + 0.519 4.882*** 0.199 1.481 
OWN*RET + 0.003 0.109 0.058 1.791* 
OWN*D*RET - -0.211 -3.195*** -0.045 -0.625 
Wedge*RET - -0.161 -2.126** -0.054 -1.224 
Wedge*D*RET + 0.107 0.953 -0.105 -0.754 
Dispersion*RET - -0.111 -1.680* -0.033 -0.586 
Dispersion*D*RET + 0.334 2.492** 0.036 0.314 
MBR*RET + -0.002 -2.035** -0.001 -0.562 
MBR*D*RET - -0.013 -2.053** 0.000 0.0738 
LEV*RET - -0.019 -1.057 -0.012 -1.531 
LEV*D*RET + 0.082 3.234*** 0.066 2.364** 
SIZE*RET + -0.003 -1.200 0.004 1.060 
SIZE*D*RET - -0.031 -3.793*** -0.015 -1.728* 
LIT*RET - -0.007 -0.400 -0.005 -0.321 
LIT*D*RET + 0.018 0.389 0.038 0.957 
D  -0.002 -0.0443 -0.126 -2.231** 
OWN  0.027 1.689* -0.034 -1.710* 
OWN*D  -0.043 -1.764* 0.057 1.854* 
Wedge  0.089 1.697* 0.009 0.279 
Wedge*D  -0.093 -1.010 0.069 1.301 
Dispersion  0.014 0.435 0.012 0.343 
Dispersion*D  0.038 0.758 0.049 0.979 
MBR  -0.001 -1.165 -0.007 -3.330*** 
MBR*D  -0.004 -1.264 0.002 0.522 
LEV  -0.037 -3.568*** -0.023 -2.083** 
LEV*D  -0.016 -1.186 -0.004 -0.226 
SIZE  0.012 6.066*** 0.005 1.694* 
SIZE*D  0.001 0.317 0.005 1.419 
LIT  -0.055 -2.747*** -0.003 -0.123 
LIT*D  0.003 0.156 0.031 1.561 
Constant  -0.025 -0.850 0.057 1.421 
Observations  9643 9643 3901 3901 
Adj. R-squared  0.246 0.246 0.220 0.220 
This table presents the regression results of estimating equation (1) separately in subsamples of strong 
and weak legal institutions. Regression (1) regresses equation (1) in subsample of strong legal institutions, 
while regression (2) in subsample of weak legal institutions. Column (3) reports the t-statistics of the 
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coefficient difference between regression (1) and (2). This table presents robust (clustered) t-statistics 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 5 Sensitivity Test - Reestimation using Ball & Shivakumar (2006) Model 
Panel A: Ownership structures and accounting conservatism 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Multiple Blockholders 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
CFO - -0.649 -28.78*** -0.621 -14.62*** 
N*CFO + 0.776 8.055*** 0.771 4.050*** 
OWN*N*CFO - -0.257 -1.572 -0.370 -0.568 
Wedge*N*CFO + -1.326 -2.065** -0.515 -0.556 
Dispersion*N*CFO + -0.354 -0.976 -0.148 -0.205 
Constant ? 0.020 3.548*** 0.023 2.044** 
Observations  11603 11603 4376 4376 
Adj. R-squared  0.332 0.332 0.329 0.329 
 
Panel B: Legal institution=Shareholder rights 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Strong  
Shareholder Rights 
(2) 
Weak  
Shareholder Rights 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics t-statistics 
CFO - -0.615 -24.68*** -0.864 -17.83*** 3.959*** 
N*CFO + 0.805 7.402*** -0.042 -0.219 3.885*** 
OWN*N*CFO - -0.223 -2.149** 0.239 0.992 -2.874*** 
Wedge*N*CFO + 2.161 1.979* 0.483 0.769 1.873* 
Dispersion*N*CFO + 0.754 2.268** 0.546 0.848 1.778** 
Constant ? 0.030 3.867*** 0.026 3.586*** 0.612 
Observations  8971 8971 2632 2632  
Adj. R-squared  0.282 0.282 0.613 0.613  
 
Panel C: Legal institution=Investor Protection 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Strong  
Shareholder Rights 
(2) 
Weak  
Shareholder Rights 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics t-statistics 
CFO - -0.621 -24.30*** -0.809 -17.25*** 3.156*** 
N*CFO + 0.789 6.908*** 0.775 3.753*** 0.314 
OWN*N*CFO - -0.706 -3.048*** -0.436 -1.939* -2.217** 
Wedge*N*CFO + 2.280 2.180** -1.145 -1.574 2.906*** 
Dispersion*N*CFO + 0.704 2.443** 0.265 0.765 1.619* 
Constant ? 0.016 1.050 0.028 3.965*** -3.112*** 
Observations  8560 8560 3043 3043  
Adj. R-squared  0.285 0.285 0.551 0.551  
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Panel D: Legal institution=Judiciary Efficiency 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Strong  
Shareholder Rights 
(2) 
Weak  
Shareholder Rights 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics t-statistics 
CFO - -0.476 -20.95*** -0.994 -27.63*** 1.823* 
N*CFO + 0.664 5.743*** 0.521 4.090*** 1.892* 
OWN*N*CFO - 0.148 0.645 -0.314 -1.900* 1.207 
Wedge*N*CFO + 0.089 0.045 -0.676 -1.295 -0.820 
Dispersion*N*CFO + 1.094 2.096** 0.597 1.097 1.535 
Constant ? 0.009 1.357 0.024 2.051** -2.612*** 
Observations  8010 8010 3593 3593  
Adj. R-squared  0.235 0.235 0.636 0.636  
This table presents the regression results of reestimating equation (2) using Ball & Shivakumar (2006) 
Model. Panel A reports the empirical results of the association between ownership structure and 
accounting conservatism. Panel B, C, D reports regressions results on how legal institutions affect the 
association between ownership structure and accounting conservatism. Panel A set legal institutions equal 
to shareholder rights, Panel B investor protection, and Panel C judiciary efficiency. For brevity, I only 
report the coefficients for the items important to my research questions, and the coefficients of other 
variables are omitted in the tables. This table presents robust (clustered) t-statistics (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 6 Sensitivity Test - Reestimation using three-year Basu (1997) 
specification 
Panel A: Ownership structures and accounting conservatism 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Multiple Blockholders 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
RET + -0.014 -0.488 -0.015 -0.315 
D*RET + 0.596 7.832*** 0.766*** 5.147*** 
OWN*RET + 0.032 2.235** 0.303*** 3.383*** 
OWN*D*RET - -0.184 -4.717*** -0.231 -1.193 
Wedge*RET - -0.039 -1.593 -0.110 -1.633 
Wedge*D*RET + 0.063 2.413** 0.044 1.974* 
Dispersion*RET - -0.018 0.634 -0.327*** -4.125*** 
Dispersion*D*RET + 0.168 2.196** 0.147 1.745* 
Constant ? 0.104 3.193*** 0.096 1.609 
Observations  12081 12081 4454 4454 
Adj. R-squared  0.124 0.124 0.143 0.143 
 
Panel B: Legal institution=Shareholder rights 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Strong  
Shareholder Rights 
(2) 
Weak  
Shareholder Rights 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics t-statistics 
RET + -0.018 -0.483 0.001 0.038 -0.136 
D*RET + 0.622 6.475*** 0.069 0.711 3.136*** 
OWN*RET + 0.074 2.388** 0.009 0.894 3.920*** 
OWN*D*RET - -0.108 -1.756* 0.004 0.093 -2.279** 
Wedge*RET - -0.060 -0.592 -0.025 -1.476 -1.192 
Wedge*D*RET + 0.907 2.430*** 0.068 0.812 1.986* 
Dispersion*RET - 0.071 1.368 0.018 0.962 1.316 
Dispersion*D*RET + 0.331 3.284*** 0.046 0.506 2.342** 
Constant  0.052 1.014 0.103 2.076** -3.294*** 
Observations  8787 8787 3294 3294  
Adj. R-squared  0.150 0.150 0.156 0.156  
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Panel C: Legal institution=Investor Protection 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Strong  
Shareholder Rights 
(2) 
Weak  
Shareholder Rights 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics t-statistics 
RET + -0.044 -1.093 0.045 1.155 -1.407 
D*RET + 0.635 6.510*** 0.056 0.552 3.957*** 
OWN*RET + 0.068 2.155** -0.027 -1.759* 3.370*** 
OWN*D*RET - -0.107 -1.728* -0.011 -0.241 -1.278 
Wedge*RET - -0.061 -0.569 -0.035 -1.636 -0.160 
Wedge*D*RET + 0.562 1.829* 0.006 0.0717 1.695* 
Dispersion*RET - 0.071 1.322 0.024 1.194 1.147 
Dispersion*D*RET + 0.330 2.276** 0.002 0.035 1.720* 
Constant  0.044 0.857 0.144 2.847*** -3.477*** 
Observations  8425 8425 3656 3656  
Adj. R-squared  -0.044 -1.093 0.127 0.127  
 
Panel D: Legal institution=Judiciary Efficiency 
 
Variable Sign 
(1) 
Strong  
Shareholder Rights 
(2) 
Weak  
Shareholder Rights 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics t-statistics 
RET + -0.011 -0.310 0.071 1.661* -1.367 
D*RET + 0.675 6.009*** 0.156 1.726* 3.784*** 
OWN*RET + 0.059 2.559** -0.006 -0.372 3.062** 
OWN*D*RET - -0.123 -1.800* -0.050 -1.125 -0.555 
Wedge*RET - -0.040 -2.133** -0.012 -0.317 -1.705* 
Wedge*D*RET + 0.175 1.721* -0.122 -1.104 1.968* 
Dispersion*RET - 0.002 0.060 0.085 1.786* -1.097 
Dispersion*D*RET + 0.276 2.020** 0.007 0.092 1.887* 
Constant  0.041 0.922 -0.005 -0.110 1.238 
Observations  7456 7456 4625 4625  
Adj. R-squared  0.164 0.164 0.091 0.091  
 
This table presents the regression results of reestimating equation (3) using three-year Basu (1997) specification. 
Panel A reports the empirical results of the association between ownership structure and accounting 
conservatism. Panel B, C, D reports regressions results on how legal institutions affect the association between 
ownership structure and accounting conservatism. Panel A set legal institutions equal to shareholder rights, Panel 
B investor protection, and Panel C judiciary efficiency. For brevity, I only report the coefficients for the items 
important to my research questions, and the coefficients of other variables are omitted in the tables. This table 
presents robust (clustered) t-statistics (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 
